# NUCLEAR CREDIBILITY DA

## 1NC

### 1NC---Generic

#### **No European prolif now. But Ukraine is the brink.**

Keating 6/1 (Joshua Keating – Global Security Reporter for GRID, “Will more countries want nuclear weapons after the war in Ukraine?”, GRID, 1 June 2022, <https://www.grid.news/story/global/2022/06/01/will-more-countries-want-nuclear-weapons-after-the-war-in-ukraine/>, MG)

On the one hand, if anything demonstrates the dangers of a world with nuclear weapons, it’s the war in Ukraine. And yet, it’s also a demonstration of why countries want to have them. Russia’s nuclear arsenal is one big reason why it has been able to invade a neighboring country (a [relatively rare event in today’s world](https://www.grid.news/story/global/2022/02/16/putin-ukraine-russia-invasion-war-biden-crisis/)) without facing an international military response. It also seems far less likely that Russia would have invaded had Ukraine possessed a nuclear arsenal of its own. Compounding the frustration for Ukrainians is the fact that the country *did* have nuclear weapons on its territory — around 1,900 Soviet warheads at the end of the Cold War in 1991, making it, on paper, the world’s third-largest nuclear power. In 1994, the newly independent nation of Ukraine agreed to give those weapons to Russia in exchange for internationally negotiated security guarantees that turned out to not be so ironclad. While Ukraine never actually had control of the weapons, which were connected to command-and-control systems in Moscow, it’s a powerful narrative nonetheless. As the country’s former defense minister [told the New York Times](https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/05/science/ukraine-nuclear-weapons.html) in February, shortly before the invasion, “We gave away the capability for nothing.” Nicholas Miller, a political scientist at Dartmouth College who studies nuclear proliferation, said the current war and recent history underline the advantages of the nuclear capability. “**It’s already well understood** that nuclear weapons seem to do a pretty good job at deterring outright invasions,” he told Grid, pointing out that North Korean officials [regularly invoke the examples of Iraq and Libya](https://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/25/world/asia/25korea.html), which abandoned their weapons of mass destruction programs and then found themselves targets of U.S.-led regime change operations. “**This just kind of reinforces that**.” **None of which suggests a looming global rush to obtain the bomb**. Davenport said the more likely possibility is more states engaging in **nuclear “hedging**”: developing the capabilities to quickly build a bomb without crossing the red line of actually doing so. Countries have done this as an insurance policy in case **security guarantees provided by their partners turn out not to be flawed, or weak**. Japan and Germany are often cited as examples of this “hedging” strategy.

#### Emerging tech coop signals a decline in US nuclear commitments to NATO

Mehta 19 (Rupal N. Mehta PhD - Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln, “Extended deterrence and assurance in an emerging technology environment”, Journal of Strategic Studies, 3 June 2019, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01402390.2019.1621173>, MG)

Constraining assurance: The drawbacks of emerging technology in alliances

While the impact of emerging technologies may yield some positive dividends in strengthening US’s ability to extend deterrence, it may indeed result in a different set of effects in how assured allies actually are. During the Cold War, the introduction of intercontinental ballistic missiles, capable of delivery of nuclear weapons another continent, without requiring forward basing on allied territory, changed the way that allies and the United States viewed their opportunity and willingness to protect allied territory.29 An increasing reliance on mobile ICBMs that did not require the same degree of infrastructure as forward-deployed conventional forces or military personnel **raised concerns** about how credible the US was in its commitment to defend another territory, potentially at the risk of inadvertently creating vulnerabilities in US national defence.

Despite political rhetoric to the contrary (especially from the current administration), it was challenging to convince allies in Europe and East Asia that the US would be willing to undertake action that could potentially risk the security of the US homeland. This raises an important question: how is this costly trade-off likely to operate in a cross-domain world where an act of aggression, potentially a provocation of war, may begin in a non-kinetic domain? Perhaps the United States may be willing to enter into a conflict in defence of an ally if the dispute begins in **cyberspace** though the uncertainty in response may produce concerns about the strength of the assurance. While allies are likely to want a generous interpretation of provocation to encourage action from the United States, it is not clear the extent to which the US may be willing to ‘**risk New York for Paris’** with the use of conventional or nuclear force if an ally is attacked with a **cyber weapon**.30 If the threshold or ‘redline’ for a US military response is uncertain in the most traditional of security environment, where known enemies can use physical weapons against a distant US or allied targets, how security umbrellas are likely to manifest in the multi-theatre, cross-capability environment is likely to be even more complex. Though the foundation of NATO and other multilateral institutions is argued to be one of capability aggregation,31 the practice of alliances often reveals the uneven distribution of resources and assurances through ‘pivots’ of attention.32

Indeed, these concerns are likely to be even more prescient with the development and inclusion of new forms of capabilities (mobile and easy to deploy to multiple places simultaneously) that can be easily moved and used elsewhere.33 If this is likely to be a consequence of the positioning of submarines, aircraft carriers, or other mobile but discrete assets, it is difficult to assess how the ‘deployment’ of cyber or drone technology, that is easier to redeploy to different theatres in defence of an ally, will impact their perception of US permanence and commitment to deter foreign aggressors. As with existing military technologies, costly **trade-offs** may complicate cross-domain strategies of extended deterrence that may **perversely destabilise** already tense regional environments.

The current state of US extended deterrence commitments to NATO/Western Europe has been significantly impacted by a new set of costly challenges (namely recent Russia behaviour) and the US conventional and nuclear ‘pivot to East Asia’. 34 While several studies have pointed again to Japan and South Korea as examples of protégé states seeking and receiving renewed assurances from the US against possible North Korean and Chinese nuclear and conventional threats, whether the evolving geo-strategic environment in which emerging technology plays a prominent role yields the same set of outcomes is uncertain.35 Given these challenges, the US has had increasing difficulty assuring its NATO allies (and subsequently its allies in East Asia) about its capacity to adequately defend both regions from their respective adversaries.36 These competing demands for the US to project hard military power in two distinct regions simultaneously have only prompted both sets of allies to become **less persuaded** of US’s capacity to actually defend them in the event of external aggression (sometimes opting to take matters into their own hands by **pursuing indigenous advances in military power**). Furthermore, adversaries themselves may be less convinced of US’s commitment to defend its allies – motivating some aggressors to use this opportunity to **provoke allies into disputes** when the extent of the US ability to provide adequate defence is uncertain.37

Some states may begin to mirror investment in similar, new types of technology to counteract the emergence of cross-domain capabilities that can be used between patrons and their client states. By pinpointing weaknesses in defensive alliance commitments, some major powers, such as China, have started to develop ‘puncture’ capabilities that are low cost, high technology and highly effective means of countering advances in extended deterrent capabilities. In the case of China, for example, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is beginning to establish ‘new-type combat forces’ that merge naval aviation, cyber and special forces to adapt to changing demands for combat readiness and military doctrine.38 Additionally, China has begun to use ‘lowintensity coercion’ to advance its maritime objectives in the East and South China Seas – often threatening US allies in the region, including the Philippines and Japan. While these moves are made to increase China’s presence and control over disputed islands in the region, their strategy regarding escalation – and avoiding conflict with the US – remains unknown.

These discussions yield several important implications, especially when we consider how they impact allied decision-making. This uncertainty may result in a variety of other second and third-order effects. First, potential allies may seek commitments from other patrons seen to be more reliable – new patrons that still rely on hard military power. Other the other hand, allies may seek other forms of assurance or seek to challenge adversaries on their own – engaging in moral hazard. Allies may even begin to develop counter-balancing technology that allows them independence from their patrons and as a means to **challenge adversaries**. Without the benefits of capability aggregation in alliances or enhanced security through substitution, this could impact the value of alliances for allies (or their patrons). In aggregate, such consideration raises important concerns about how emerging technologies will influence the allied side of the strategic interaction.

#### **Lack of confidence in the US nuclear commitment enables nuclear proliferation**

Pelopidas 15 (Benoit Pelopidas - CISAC affiliate and lecturer in international relations at the School of Sociology, Politics and International Studies, “Chapter 3: The Nuclear Straitjacket”, The Future of Extended Deterrence, Pages 73-74, Georgetown University Press, 2015, MG)

In international relations theory, the most famous proponents of structural realism, area studies specialists inspired by it, and even critical voices have formulated forecasts and policy recommendations based on the nuclear straitjacket, even if their analytical assessments are often formulated in probabilistic terms.8 Major proponents of structural realism argued that the protection offered by the two superpowers during the Cold War was the essential cause of **nuclear nonproliferation** during that period. This led to a series of proliferation forecasts about the post– Cold War period.9 Benjamin Frankel offers the clearest formulation of this alternative when he writes that “there is an inherent contradiction between welcoming the end of bipolarity and deploring the spread of nuclear weapons” and “it is precisely the large size and sophistication of the superpowers’ nuclear forces, and the avowed **willingness of the superpowers to threaten to use them on behalf of their clients**, . . . that have prevented a more pervasive **weapons proliferation**.”10 Most recently, Michael Horowitz phrases the nuclear straitjacket in terms of likelihood when he writes that “[i]n a world where progress towards arms reductions reverses, some states with civilian nuclear power might begin to prepare quietly for a world where they need to build their own small nuclear arsenal. Such an outcome might become likely if the economic struggles in the United States lead the country to pull back significantly from its international obligations, including its extended deterrence umbrella.”11

A similar tendency can be identified in works of area studies specialists inspired by structural realism. Beyond the works of John Mearsheimer on the necessity of an in de pen dent nuclear deterrent in Ukraine, Fiona Hill and Pamela Jewett can be mentioned.12 A few months before Kiev decided to give its weapons back to Russia, it insisted on the protection that these weapons would offer against a Russia depicted as expansionist, notably because of the remaining Russian minority in Eastern Ukraine.13 Similarly, Yair Evron accepts the idea that the end of bipolarity created additional incentives to get nuclear weapons.14 Some interpretations of the German case and, more broadly, of nuclear abstinence inside the Eu ro pean community tend to rely on the nuclear straitjacket.15 Most recently, Andrew Kennedy argued that “implicit nuclear umbrellas” and disarmament diplomacy were key drivers of Indian nuclear restraint until 1998.16

Even critical voices like Glenn Chafetz, who intends to build an “alternative to the neo- realist perspective” for the post– Cold War world, ends up transposing the argument of the nuclear straitjacket at the level of perceptions. In his view, what matters for forecasting proliferation is not whether the protector will maintain its security guarantee but if the **protégé believes the protector will do so**.17 This approach leaves room for the possibility that the protégé could **misinterpret the intentions of the protector** and decide not to go for the bomb even though the protector has not made a sincere credible pledge. Thus, the protégé in this instance would not go nuclear because it believes that the protector’s defective pledge of extended nuclear deterrence is valid. The fact that the protégé makes a mistake should not mask that its supposed reasoning remains the same.18 Most recently, Francis Gavin argues that the resolve to strike as a foundation of a credible nuclear security guarantee might have created **incentives to go for the bomb** for countries to which the deterrent pledge is not extended, but he does not criticize the effi - cacy of extended nuclear deterrence as a nonproliferation tool.19

#### **Allied prolif causes nuke war, Asian nuclear arms races, and collapses alliances**

Gerzhoy and Miller 16 (Gene Gerzhoy - Former Research Fellow Project on Managing the Atom/International Security Program and now a Congressional Fellow at the American Political Science Association, Nicholas Miller - Associate Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College, “Donald Trump thinks more countries should have nuclear weapons. Here’s what the research says”, The Washington Post, 6 April 2016, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/04/06/should-more-countries-have-nuclear-weapons-donald-trump-thinks-so/>, MG)

Research does not support the idea that the spread of nuclear weapons is **inevitable**. But isolationist “America First” policies could prompt that spread. Defining U.S. strategic interests primarily in terms of monetary gain, and curtailing U.S. global engagement toward that end, would boost the probability that our **allies would respond by going nuclear**.

Would nuclear proliferation be good for U.S. interests?

What about Trump’s second proposition: that proliferation by our allies would be good for U.S. interests? This argument is based on the idea that nuclear-armed allies could help contain U.S. adversaries and enable the United States to save money. As Trump told Cooper, “I would rather see Japan having some form of defense, and maybe even offense, against North Korea.” And as he suggested, the United States can’t afford to protect Japan and South Korea — and therefore, “they have to pay us or we have to let them protect themselves.”

Reducing military commitments and letting allies build their own nuclear weapons might save money for the United States. But international relations scholarship suggests that allied proliferation would have broader negative repercussions. Among these would be **declining U.S. influence**. When nations gain their own military capabilities, they **rely less on their allies** and become less subject to their sway. And that can undermine a senior partner’s ability to hold its junior allies back from risky military actions.

In other words, allowing or encouraging proliferation would worsen the “American weakness” that Trump decries.

Recent nonproliferation research underscores this proposition. Mark Bell shows that nuclear allies are likely to become more independent of their patrons and in some cases can **develop more assertive foreign policies**. And Francis Gavin and Matthew Kroenig show that the fear of declining influence was one reason why most American administrations vigorously opposed the spread of nuclear weapons.

**Nuclear allies** can also become **security risks**. Vipin Narang demonstrates that when weaker states gain nuclear weapons, they often seek to coerce their senior partners into intervening on their behalf by threatening to use nuclear weapons. That’s what Israel did at the height of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. That’s what South Africa did during its 1988 confrontation with Cuban forces in Angola. And that’s what Pakistan did in the midst of its 1990 military crisis with India.

Instead of relieving the United States of a military burden, as Donald Trump suggests, having more nuclear allies could increase the risk that the United States would **get involved in conflicts that might turn nuclear**.

Furthermore, were South Korea or Japan to begin developing nuclear weapons, their rivals might be tempted to launch preventive military strikes, which research suggests has been frequently considered in the past. The road to nuclear acquisition is often rocky and **increases the likelihood of militarized conflict**. For example, Soviet worries that West Germany would acquire nuclear weapons helped trigger the Berlin Crisis.

And if Japan or South Korea actually acquired nuclear weapons, we could possibly see a **nuclear arms race in Asia**. Japan’s neighbors, including South Korea, would fear resurgent Japanese militarism. North Korea would expand its nuclear capabilities. China would continue to expand its own nuclear arsenal.

**Why haven’t we seen nuclear arms races before?**

[Nuclear “domino effects”](https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/handle/10822/558060) have not been common historically. But that’s largely because of [determined U.S. efforts to stop them](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09636412.2014.874189).

Since the dawn of the nuclear age, the United States has [pursued nonproliferation as a top policy priority](http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/ISEC_a_00205#.VwAzcxMrJfQ). That includes sponsoring and enforcing the [Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)](http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NPTtext.shtml). [Research suggests the NPT](http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/682080) has been instrumental in limiting the spread of nuclear weapons, in part by coordinating states’ beliefs about one another’s nonproliferation commitments. To develop nuclear weapons, Japan and South Korea would need to violate or withdraw from the NPT. That could prompt U.S. allies and adversaries in other regions — including Saudi Arabia, Germany and Iran — to question the treaty’s viability and consider seeking their own nuclear arsenals.

Would this be so bad? After all, no two nuclear armed states have fought a major war with each other, and nuclear weapons have not been used in conflict since the United States bombed Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945.

But the conclusion that nuclear weapons produce peace is subject to debate. It’s true that there has been no war between major powers since 1945. But that may be due to [other](http://www.jstor.org/stable/2538971) [factors](https://books.google.com/books?id=J7ATQb6LZX0C&dq=pinker+angels&lr=&source=gbs_navlinks_s). The quantitative evidence linking nuclear weapons to a reduced risk of conflict is [**limited**](http://jcr.sagepub.com/content/57/3/478.short)[**at best**](http://jcr.sagepub.com/content/59/1/74).

Further, [theoretical and historical evidence suggests that **nuclear accidents and miscalculations are likely**](http://press.princeton.edu/titles/5301.html). More countries with nuclear weapons would mean more opportunities for catastrophic nuclear mistakes.

**So what’s the takeaway?**

A look at history shows us that nuclear proliferation is **anything but inevitable**. U.S. nonproliferation efforts have been surprisingly successful, even when the United States was weaker than it is today.

Without firm U.S. opposition to the spread of nuclear weapons — a policy implemented through “carrots” like alliances and “sticks” like sanctions — the world would probably have far more than nine countries with nuclear weapons. What’s more, research suggests that nuclear proliferation would **reduce U.S. world influence**, undermine global stability and **increase the risk of nuclear war**.

## Uniqueness

### U - Brink Now

#### **Ukraine set the brink – it’s up to US credibility now**

Schepers 6/2 (Névine Schepers - a Senior Researcher in the Swiss and Euro-Atlantic Security Team at the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich, “Russia’s War and the Global Nuclear Order”, Volume 10 of Policy Perspectives, 2 June 2022, <https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/PP10-6_2022-EN.pdf>, MG)

By bringing nuclear weapons back in the international limelight, the war seems to have emphasized the benefits of relying on nuclear deterrence, inciting **fears of renewed proliferation**. Given that the outcome of the war remains unknown, it is **too early to draw conclusions** about whether this will encourage more states to develop nuclear programs. However, some preliminary effects are already apparent.

On the one hand, Ukraine’s history as a former Soviet Republic that inherited and subsequently returned Soviet nuclear weapons to Moscow in exchange for security assurances gives a different tone to Russia’s use of deterrence in this war. The appeal of such negative security assurances has therefore diminished. Within the NPT regime, many non-nuclear weapon states have previously placed particular emphasis on negative security assurances as a means to protect themselves from nuclear conflict. The breaching of such an assurance to Ukraine further undermines efforts to address security gaps posed by the imbalance between nuclear haves and have-nots. More than 100 non-nuclear weapon states rely on negative security assurances included in the protocols to Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones treaties. If those are no longer deemed credible and a state feels under existential threat, developing a **domestic nuclear deterrent** may appear more appealing in the future.

On the other hand, the relevance of positive security guarantees, established through legally binding frameworks such as NATO, has increased, as Sweden and Finland’s requests for NATO accession illustrate. This reinforces the perceived value of extended deterrence, meaning the commitment of a nuclear power to deter and respond to attacks in defense of allies. When allies are **confident in the credibility of extended deterrence**, they **refrain** from developing their own deterrent.3 However, increased reliance on such security guarantees in Europe adds further weight on the US as the central deterrence provider. While Washington’s allies are moving to reinforce conventional deterrence capabilities, the credibility of nuclear deterrence will mostly remain a **US responsibility**, one that has to withstand future election cycles and potential Trump-like leadership figures.

#### **Ukraine is forcing allies to reconsider their trust in the US nuclear arsenal**

Knickmeyer and Chang 6/21 (Ellen Knickmeyer - former Associated Press bureau chief for West Africa and Washington Post bureau chief for Baghdad and Cairo, Yong Jun Chang – Seoul Reporter for ABC News, “No nukes? Ukraine-Russian war will shape world's arsenals”, ABCNews, 21 June 2022, <https://abcnews.go.com/amp/Politics/wireStory/nukes-ukraine-russian-war-shape-worlds-arsenals-85522538>, MG)

“Our country should also develop a nuclear program. And prepare for a possible nuclear war," said Lee, voicing a desire that a February poll showed was shared by 3 out of 4 South Koreans.

It’s a point that people and politicians of non-nuclear powers globally are raising more often, at what has become a **destabilizing** **moment** in more than a half-century of global nuclear nonproliferation efforts, one aggravated by the daily example of nuclear Russia tearing apart non-nuclear Ukraine.

That reconsideration by non-nuclear states is playing out in Asia. The region is home to an ever-more assertive North Korea, China, Russia and Iran — three nuclear powers and one near-nuclear power — but is unprotected by the kind of nuclear umbrella and broad defense alliance that for decades has shielded NATO countries.

Vulnerable countries will **look to the lessons from Ukraine** — especially whether Russia succeeds in swallowing big pieces of Ukraine while brandishing its nuclear arsenal to hold other nations at bay — as they consider keeping or pursuing nuclear weapons, security experts say.

As important, they say, is how well the **U.S. and its allies** are persuading other partners in Europe, the Persian Gulf and Asia to trust in the shield of **U.S.-led nuclear and conventional arsenals** and not pursue their own nuclear bombs.

### U – AT Allied Prolif Now

#### **Ukraine war won’t start nuclear prolif BUT is causing allied interest in it to rise**

Dalton 4/8 (Toby Dalton - Senior fellow and co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Nuclear Nonproliferation After the Russia-Ukraine War”, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, 8 April 2022, <https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2022/04/08/nuclear-nonproliferation-after-the-russia-ukraine-war/>, MG)

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, accompanied by nuclear threats to deter intervention by NATO states, is **unlikely to spark a broad wave of nuclear proliferation**. However, growing concerns among political leaders in Japan and South Korea about nuclear coercion by China and North Korea, and questions about the **durability of U.S. defense commitments**, is driving interest in nuclear acquisition. To stanch this interest, the United States may be pressured to share nuclear weapons with these allies, while Russia could look to deploy nuclear weapons on the territories of its allies.

A popular but ahistorical narrative is emerging about Russia’s war on Ukraine: if only Kyiv had retained the Soviet nuclear weapons stationed on its territory at the end of the Cold War, it could have deterred Vladimir Putin’s nuclear-backed annexation of Crimea in 2014 and attempted occupation of the rest of Ukraine today. This narrative ignores the fact that those weapons were controlled by Russia and Ukrainian leaders at the time did not want to be treated as an international pariah for attempting to become a nuclear-armed state. Rather than focus on a flawed counterfactual that emphasizes the importance of nuclear power, the world would be much better off asking how Russia’s actions could affect nuclear nonproliferation. In the context of perceived growing risks of inter-state conflict and a re-ordering of the international system, it is plausible that one or more countries **worried** about suffering a similar fate as Ukraine **decide to seek nuclear weapons**, or that Russia and the United States opt to violate international nonproliferation rules by sharing nuclear weapons with allies.

#### **NATO allies have limited anxiety now---fear of a revived pivot is lingering**

Morgan and Péczeli 21 (Amelia Morgan - research associate at the Center for Science and Security Studies and a doctoral candidate in the Defence Studies Department at King’s College, Anna Péczeli - postdoctoral research fellow at the Center for Global Security Research at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory , “Europe’s Evolving Deterrence Discourse”, Center for Global Security Research, February 2021, <https://cgsr.llnl.gov/content/assets/docs/CGSR_euro_det_final.pdf>, MG)

Any transatlantic debate on deterrence takes its cues from the U.S. debate. Due to its large international role, its correspondingly large military, and its sizable and vibrant strategic community, the United States has been at the forefront of deterrence thinking since the advent of the nuclear age. Its unique role as the military protector of many countries in and beyond NATO has given U.S. thinking on deterrence and other security matters enormous weight. If in the past mainstream U.S. deterrence thinking often had a streak of alarmism, it largely stemmed from concerns about the **credibility of extended deterrence**. As this concept seeks to deter an adversary from attacking an ally of the United States, rather than the U.S. homeland itself, it was burdened with a credibility dilemma that it sought to ameliorate by the forwarddeployment of conventional and **nuclear forces**, as well as through unique nuclear sharing arrangements. In retrospect, it is fair to say that Europeans were generally less concerned with the specifics of the Western deterrence posture, as long as certain basics—above all, a strong and credible U.S. commitment to European security—remained assured.

The fact that a **growing number of European observers** now fear that this U.S. commitment is **waning** is among the greatest game changers in the deterrence debate. Washington’s harsh criticism of **European military underperformance** as well as the **emergence of China** as the new U.S. strategic rival have sparked **European nervousness** about Washington’s continued commitment to the security of the continent.26 Although the United States reacted promptly to reassure NATO’s eastern allies after Russia’s annexation of Crimea, thereby demonstrating its continued interest in European security, fears of abandonment have led to a lively discussion about European alternatives to U.S.-centric security arrangements. However, this discussion is likely to yield few tangible results. Europe remains a conglomerate of nation states of different sizes, cultures, historical experiences, and geographic outlooks. Hence, there is no European strategic culture that could form a basis for a European-only deterrence policy and posture. A U.S. exit from Europe may force some countries to explore new forms of closer defense cooperation, yet others are more likely to pursue separate bilateral deals with Washington.

## Links

### L – Non-Nuclear Deterrence

#### Perception of US introduction of emerging tech to deter undermines the traditional justifications for nuclear presence. Shreds assurances and leads to war.

Kulesa 21 (Łukasz Kulesa - Deputy Head of Research at the Polish Institute of International Affairs, “Chapter 10: New Capabilities and Nuclear Deterrence in Europe”, Alliances, Nuclear Weapons and Escalation: Managing Deterrence in the 21st Century, Pages 119-122, 14 December 2021, MG)

The impact of **new technologies and emerging military capabilities** on nuclear deterrence is the subject of intense debate among experts, with multiple and often contradictory hypotheses. 14 Some assert that the nature of nuclear deterrence will be radically transformed and that the increased vulnerability of nuclear systems and improved defences will lead to the role of nuclear weapons becoming **marginalised**, an increase in the number of nuclear weapons or the adoption of more dangerous nuclear postures by some possessors (e.g. predelegation, launch-on-warning, pre-emption). But there are also more conservative predictions—namely that new technologies may not fully deliver on their disruptive promises and/or that their offensive advantages would be balanced by defensive countermeasures, leaving the role of nuclear deterrence more or less intact.

The analysis conducted so far in this chapter seems to indicate that the European True Believers (in nuclear deterrence) remain unconvinced that any radical changes are approaching. The UK and France are taking steps to safeguard the functioning of their nuclear deterrence in a more challenging environment, utilising the assistance of new technologies. But they continue to see the role of nuclear weapons as ‘ultima ratio’ in escalation management and retaliation, to which no comparable alternative is likely to emerge. This is likely to remain the default position.

The future trajectory of development and deployment of new **non-nuclear capabilities by the US** will have an impact on the **alliance’s nuclear deterrence posture,** especially regarding the rationale for maintaining US forwarddeployed nuclear forces in Europe and continuing NATO’s nuclear sharing. If US non-nuclear capabilities are **seen as providing the same or perhaps a higher level of deterrence** as nuclear weapons deployed in Europe, this may strengthen the case for their **withdrawal to the US** or **complete elimination**. One can envisage, for example, deployment of intermediate-range conventional hypersonic systems in Europe as substitutes for B61 nuclear bombs. In that case, the main axis of frictions may be between the US and those states that are particularly attracted to the forward deployment of nuclear weapons (even if they are not stationed on their territories), such as Poland and other eastern flank countries. These would most likely point out that Russia would treat the replacement of **nuclear assets with non-nuclear ones as an invitation to escalate any crisis to the nuclear level**, and that a nuclear-sharing model that includes direct involvement of a number of European allies **cannot easily be replicated** with regard to most of the new capabilities.

A number of other political-military challenges may arise. First, we may face the emergence of a gap in thinking about **escalation management** and the employment of new capabilities between the US and its allies, with consequences for the nuclear sphere. The US is likely to maintain its preeminence in terms of the development and deployment of new technologies, and of formulating conceptual approaches as regards their use. Since individual NATO countries, most importantly the UK and France, aim to actively contribute their own ideas and approaches to discussions on issues such as **artificial intelligence** development, space and **cyber** policy, common NATO positions can be formulated. However, the US is likely to be far ahead of the majority of NATO allies. Further, the US and other technologically advanced allies may not be willing to share the full details of some of the more sensitive technologies they possess at NATO fora. The September 2021 announcement of the creation of the trilateral security partnership between the US, Australia and the UK (AUKUS) can be seen as potentially contributing to this trend. While the initial attention was focused on the nuclear-powered submarines, the participants also pledged closer cooperation on **cyber capabilities, artificial intelligence**, quantum technologies and other undersea capabilities. This may lead to strengthening the links and interoperability between the three countries, but would not engage NATO (which has a broad partnership relationship with Australia) as a whole.

Consequently, in a crisis, allies may be surprised by certain US actions and their escalatory effects. This may not necessarily be caused by any lack of consultation or advanced warning but may happen because of their lack of understanding of the doctrinal, technological and military aspects of the US’s approach to operations. 15 The reverse may also be true. The US may be **forced to react to developments** arising from the employment of **new technologies by some of its NATO allies**, including a situation in which such an action escalates conflict to the **nuclear threshold** (e.g. cyber attack on the adversary’s nuclear command and control). The alliance’s response to this challenge will need to take the form of in-depth consultations, developing joint doctrinal documents and investment in simulations and wargaming.

Second, integration of new capabilities and new domains into the deterrence and defence toolbox seems inevitable. Some changes will have important consequences at the tactical and operational levels (e.g. ubiquity of low-cost unmanned systems and their increased level of autonomy and effectiveness) and some may reach the strategic level. Any sudden devaluation of nuclear deterrence due to a technological breakthrough—for example, the end of ballistic missile submarines’ ‘near-invulnerability’—would have major ramifications and force the three NATO nuclear possessors to re-evaluate their posture, with major consequences for the alliance. But less revolutionary changes may be significant, as they would impact on traditional NATO approaches to burden and risk-sharing, deterrence and assurance.

In the foreseeable future, a scenario of US military disengagement from NATO and Europe remains far-fetched, which means that Europe can rely on the full range of US capabilities when facing Russia. However, if the US or other allies were able to provide advanced strategic non-nuclear assets for common defence and deterrence, they may be inclined to reduce the ‘traditional’ contributions of their armed forces. The UK’s recent Integrated Review may pave the way, as it highlights the contribution of UK offensive cyber and precision strike capabilities (as well as nuclear forces) to NATO, while simultaneously reducing the size of its land forces. Other allies may follow the same logic. For example, some of the European states currently hosting US nuclear weapons may be interested in exploring the option of providing specific **new capabilities** to the alliance **instead of continuing with their nuclear mission**. However, the question would arise as to whether such a rebalancing and new division of labor would increase the credibility of deterrence or be seen as weakening NATO’s ability to provide the necessary levels of ‘boots on the ground’.

Third, there is a danger of **increased polarisation** between the allies interested in making full use of the opportunities created by EDT and those advocating more restraint and engagement with potential adversaries as the best way to reduce the destabilising effects of new technologies. 16 In the NATO context, one can expect future discussions about the deployment of specific weapon systems, which may resemble Cold War–era debates between the proponents of strengthening deterrence and pursuing arms control. For example, should NATO countries move forward with, or rather aim to limit, the deployment of certain categories of autonomous or hypersonic systems, looking for similar restraint from Russia?

Finally, NATO’s adversaries will have a vote in deciding the future role of nuclear weapons and new capabilities in the alliance’s deterrence mix. The further pursuit of new military technologies by Russia, and increased lethality of its own mix of offensive and defensive non-nuclear capabilities, will necessitate a periodical review and adaptation of NATO’s approach. The issue will become particularly pressing if Russia manages to achieve dominance on some non-nuclear ‘rungs’ of escalation—for example, hypersonic precision strike systems or counterspace capabilities. The alliance may then be forced to broaden the role of nuclear weapons to maintain the credibility of its deterrence strategy, including potentially an **explicit threat of nuclear retaliation** to non-nuclear strategic attacks, or prepare its own non-nuclear response, using a range of new technologies.

#### **Nuclear deterrence post-ukraine avoids WMD terrorism and nuclear war**

Beres 22 (Louis René Beres PhD - professor emeritus of international law at Purdue, “Nuclear War Avoidance: Why It Is Time to Start Worrying, Again”, AirUniversity, 18 March 2022, <https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/ASOR/Journals/Volume-1_Issue-1/Beres_Nuclear_War_Avoidance.pdf>, MG)

Any planetary system of law and power management that seeks to avoid nuclear war must recognize a significantly underlying axiom: as egregious crimes under international law, war and genocide need not be mutually exclusive.25 On the contrary, as one may learn from history, war could sometimes be undertaken as an efficient manner of national, ethnic, racial, or religious annihilation.26 This was almost certainly the case with respect to Germany’s World War II aggressions, crimes oriented deliberately to Adolph Hitler’s always primary war against the Jews. When the war in question becomes nuclear, the **argument must become unassailable**.

In light of **Russia’s 2022 war against Ukraine**, it is time to start worrying again about nuclear war avoidance, but this time, just worrying will not be enough. The only reasonable use for nuclear weapons on this imperiled planet will still be as **controlled elements of dissuasion** and never as actual weapons of war. The underlying principles of such a rational diplomatic posture go back long before the advent of nuclear weapons. In his oft-studied classic On War, ancient Chinese strategist Sun-Tzu reminds succinctly, “subjugating the enemy’s army without fighting is the true pinnacle of excellence.”27

There can be no more compelling strategic dictum. This distilled wisdom represents the “one big thing” for US strategists, commanders, and policy makers to know. It would be best not to have any enemies in the first place, of course, but such residually high hopes would be without any intellectual foundation. They would always **remain unsupportable**.

The unwelcome outcomes in Afghanistan and recent Russian invasion of Ukraine do not portend heightened nuclear warfare prospects per se, but they do suggest a generally widening **diminution of American power**. Among other things, this diminution could spawn various regional or even global crises that bring the United States into a much larger ambit of **WMD scenarios**, ones involving both **war** and **terror**. Even if the United States does not become involved in any such crises directly, other states or even the wider world could quickly become entangled in extremis atomicum.

Immediately, to whatever extent possible, national leaders should make all appropriate intellectual and analytic preparations for nuclear war avoidance. In carrying out this responsibility, especially careful attention should be directed to the scenarios of inadvertent nuclear war, as well as narratives pertaining both to accidental nuclear conflict and to a nuclear war resulting from miscalculation. All the while, prospects for a deliberate nuclear war should never be downplayed; preparations for **credible nuclear deterrence must be continuously maintained at the highest possible levels**. To meet this urgent requirement, leaders of nuclear and near-nuclear states must first acknowledge the recurrent seriousness of a global atomic threat. This is not a time for any leadership complacence. Instead, it is an optimal time to “start worrying again.”Θκ

#### **Enhanced conventional assets undermines the perception of credible US nuclear deterrence**

Bradley 15 (Jennifer Bradley - provides on-site support at United States Strategic Command in the Plans and Policy Directorate as part of the Deterrence Analysis Plans Support group in Omaha, “Increasing Uncertainty: The Dangers of Relying on Conventional Forces for Nuclear Deterrence”, Air University, July-August 2015, <https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/ASPJ/journals/Volume-29_Issue-4/V-Bradley.pdf>, MG)

The NPR overstated the improvement in US-Russia relations, and the US declaration that Russia was not an enemy did not consider how Russia viewed the relationship. Failure to take into account that country’s deep-seated suspicion of the United States invalidated the NPR’s assumption that improved ties would allow the United States to rely less on nuclear weapons. Further, US policy and Russian policy do not agree on the usability of nuclear weapons. The US desire to decrease the role of nuclear weapons and compensate with conventional weapons suggests that **US policy makers do not feel that nuclear weapons are usable**. However, this perception contrasts with Russia’s nuclear doctrine and statements, which have been consistent for well over a decade, that these weapons are quite usable. These differences are further emphasized as the United States debates unilateral reduction in nuclear capabilities while Russia violates a landmark arms-control treaty to increase the types and capabilities of its nuclear arsenal to gain a strategic advantage.46 This situation creates a dangerous divide that has the potential for **miscalculation and deterrence failure**.

Both Russia and China are concerned with US use of advanced conventional capabilities in a strategic manner to negate their nuclear deterrent. According to the NPR, the United States has the strongest conventional capabilities in the world and an alliance system that further augments those capabilities. America has also demonstrated its willingness to use conventional power repeatedly over the last 25 years. The very usability of conventional precision-strike weapons capable of creating effects once reserved only for nuclear forces undermines deterrence by creating or reinforcing perceptions in our adversaries that their **nuclear forces are vulnerable** and that the United States may have an incentive to strike them. Both China and Russia are reevaluating their nuclear doctrines and **relying more on nuclear** weapons to counter this perceived threat.

Conclusion

From nuclear weapons’ pinnacle of importance at the end of the Cold War to today, the United States has steadily decreased the attention paid to its nuclear arsenal and strategy, but nuclear deterrence has not decreased in its overall importance. It is clear that our adversaries place much more value in their nuclear arsenals than does the United States, precisely to deter America’s unmatched conventional power. The US decision to rely more on conventional weapons to achieve nuclear deterrence has created dangerous potential for miscalculation in its deterrent relationships with Russia and China.

The United States has fallen into a “**mirror imaging” trap** by assuming that other nations place the same low value on nuclear weapons that it does and that they have the same priority of reaching “Global Zero.” The Obama administration has even gone so far as to recommend unilateral nuclear reductions, which were made outside arms-control negotiations with Russia.47 Part of this policy is that other nuclear-armed nations will follow the US example and choose to reduce the size of their nuclear arsenal. This assumption does not take into account how our opponents interpret their security environment and the role that nuclear weapons play in safeguarding their interests.

#### Enhanced non-nuclear deterrence undermines allied assurance

Morgan and Péczeli 21 (Amelia Morgan - research associate at the Center for Science and Security Studies and a doctoral candidate in the Defence Studies Department at King’s College, Anna Péczeli - postdoctoral research fellow at the Center for Global Security Research at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory , “Europe’s Evolving Deterrence Discourse”, Center for Global Security Research, February 2021, <https://cgsr.llnl.gov/content/assets/docs/CGSR_euro_det_final.pdf>, MG)

All this suggests that the paramount role of the United States in setting the overall direction of Western deterrence thinking will **remain unchanged**.27 However, as the U.S. strategic community—like U.S. society more broadly—appears more and more polarized, deterrence thinking, too, has become bifurcated. While U.S. policy remains firmly grounded in what Keith Payne has termed “difficult deterrence” (e.g., strong conventional forces, limited nuclear options, missile defenses, little or no arms control), there is also an idealist streak that ranges from advocating more sweeping arms control measures all the way to nuclear abolition.28 While this latter school of thought had failed when President Obama sought to adopt some of its elements during his first tenure, it still commands considerable political respectability and could return with a new Democratic administration.

Both schools of thought can be a challenge for European security. By giving short shrift to arms control and by advocating **new weapon systems** to fill alleged gaps in the Western deterrence posture vis-à-vis a more risk-prone Russia, the orthodox deterrence school tends to irritate those Europeans who worry about the effects of such policies on their own public opinion. By contrast, the arms control school’s preference for cooperative solutions runs the risk of interpreting certain alliance achievements (e.g., nuclear sharing arrangements or U.S. ballistic missile defense installations in Europe) as a potential hindrance on the way to new agreements. Hence, some Europeans, notably in the continent’s East, could get **nervous** about what in their view would constitute a naïve U.S. approach in dealing with Russia or other opponents.

### L – Artifical Intelligence

#### **Widespread AI integration destabilizes nuclear guarantees**

Lohn and Geist 18 (Andrew J. Lohn - Senior Fellow at Georgetown's Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET), Edward Geist - policy researcher at the RAND Corporation, “How Might Artificial Intelligence Affect the Risk of Nuclear War?”, RAND Corporation, January 2018, <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/324723351_How_Might_Artificial_Intelligence_Affect_the_Risk_of_Nuclear_War>, MG)

Nuclear strategy is about more than just deterrence (see the table opposite). Deterrence is the use of retaliatory threats to dissuade an adversary from attacking oneself or one’s allies. Deterrence can be categorized into central deterrence (deterrence of an attack on one’s homeland) and extended deterrence (deterrence of an attack on one’s strategic partners) (Cimbala, 2002). Nuclear weapons can also be used for compellence—coercing the enemy into doing something that it does not want to do (Long, 2008, p. 9). In addition to coercive deterrence and compellence threats, nuclear weapons can be employed for warfighting, the way they were at the end of the Second World War. The practical complexities of nuclear strategy stem from the challenges of assurance—making extended deterrence credible. During the Cold War, the United States accumulated its massive stockpile of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons to convince its allies that that it would be willing to retaliate to conventional Soviet attacks in Europe with nuclear responses. As United Kingdom Defence Minister Denis Healey observed, it took “**only five per cent credibility of American retaliation to deter the Russians, but ninety five per cent credibility to reassure the Europeans**” (Healey, 1989). The scale of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, however, alarmed Soviet leaders, who believed that the Americans might be attempting to develop a first-strike capability against them. This distrust underscored the need for reassurance—convincing adversaries that they will not be attacked as long as they refrain from the behavior that is being deterred (Schelling, 1966).

[Chart Omitted]

Strategic stability exists when adversaries lack a significant incentive to engage in provocative behavior.5 There are several kinds of strategic stability that are distinguished by their varying temporal scales. First-strike stability exists when no state can carry out an attack out of the blue against its opponent without significant fear of a devastating retaliation. Such a possibility is best deterred by the threat of overwhelming and automatic retaliation from secure second-strike forces (Cimbala, 2002, p. 66). Crisis stability, by contrast, aims to prevent or manage escalation during crises, as occurred in Berlin and Cuba in the early 1960s (Cimbala, 2002, p. 98). In these circumstances, national leaders are under immense pressure not to show weakness by backing down, but the chance of inadvertent escalation increases significantly as states attempt to maneuver the nuclear forces for signaling purposes. In this context, the kind of large automatic retaliation that is ideal for maximizing first-strike stability is a recipe for disaster.

Finally, arms race stability is achieved when there are no exploitable inequalities in adversaries’ military capabilities (Cimbala, 2002, p. 110). States avoid these inequalities to manage the risks and costs of long-term competition and to avoid compromising first-strike stability and crisis stability in the future. Nuclear strategy is difficult because these objectives are in tension with each other.

In an extreme case, **AI could undermine the condition of MAD and make nuclear war winnable**, but it takes much less to undermine strategic stability. AI advancements merely need to **cast doubt on the credibility of retaliation** at some level of conflict. Major nuclear powers, such as the United States, Russia, and China, have a shared interest in maintaining the credibility of central deterrence, but they seek regional advantages in pursuit of what they regard as their core strategic interests. Areas where credibility is already strained, such as certain **extended deterrence guarantees**, are **particularly vulnerable to destabilization**. The increasingly multipolar strategic environment is also encouraging forms of competition that threaten stability. For instance, the United States is interested in developing the capability to track and target a minor nuclear power’s mobile missile launchers, but Russia and China fear that the same technology could mature into a threat to their more sophisticated retaliatory forces. In a crisis situation, the employment or availability of AI-enabled intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) or weapon systems could stoke tensions and increase the chances of inadvertent escalation. Finally, the pursuit of advanced military capabilities is **liable to cause arms race instability** even if those technologies are nonviable, as in the historical case of missile defense. The challenge AI poses to strategic stability is not unique to this particular technology, but it is more acute because of rapid technical progress in AI and its many potential intersections with nuclear strategy. Most of the specific applications AI are likely to be used for, such as analysis of ISR data, controlling autonomous sensor platforms, and automated target recognition (ATR) have been eagerly sought for decades but were beyond the capability of available technology. Even without further breakthroughs, incremental progress using existing AI techniques may make these **long-sought goals practical realities** in the foreseeable future.

Both Russia and China appear to believe that the United States is attempting to leverage AI to threaten the survivability of their strategic nuclear forces, stoking mutual distrust that could prove catastrophic in a crisis. As Paul Bracken observes, ongoing improvements in technology such as AI threaten to “**undermine minimum deterrence strategies**” and “blur the line between conventional and nuclear war” (Bracken, 2017).

### L – Biotechnology

#### **Changing biotech defensive posture away from ambiguous nuclear gives the perception of weakening US commitments**

Péczeli 17 (Anna Péczeli - postdoctoral research fellow at the Center for Global Security Research at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, “Best Options for the Nuclear Posture Review”, Strategic Studies Quarterly Volume 11, Fall 2017, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/26271605.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A6fe35810b46ec7d6f99b78951d9cc1c9&ab_segments=&origin=&acceptTC=1>, MG)

During the debate under the Obama administration, the DOD cautioned against dramatic changes in declaratory policy and emphasized the benefits of the long-standing tradition of the so-called calculated ambiguity strategy. The main idea behind this strategy is that the United States **does not specify the nature of response** to a non-nuclear aggression but at the same time it threatens with an overwhelming and devastating counterattack. This could mean an **asymmetric nuclear attack** in response to the use of chemical or biological weapons.28 Maintaining this option implies that the Obama administration still saw a few non-nuclear scenarios when the threat of a devastating nuclear response was deemed **essential** for the security of the United States or its allies and partners.

As a result, the 2010 NPR concluded that sole purpose was acceptable as a long-term goal but the current circumstances were not adequate to implement it immediately. The document stated, “the United States is therefore not prepared at the present time to adopt a universal policy that deterring nuclear attack is the sole purpose of nuclear weapons, but will work to establish conditions under which such a policy could be safely adopted.”29 To create these conditions, the United States outlined two goals: first, it “will continue to strengthen conventional capabilities and reduce the role of nuclear weapons in deterring non-nuclear attacks, with the objective of making deterrence of nuclear attack on the United States or our allies and partners the sole purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons”30 and, second, it will “continue efforts to strengthen regional security architectures and eliminate chemical and biological weapons, so that over time all states possessing nuclear weapons can be secure in making deterrence of nuclear attack the sole purpose of nuclear weapons.”31

It is very unlikely that the adversaries of the United States could pose an existential threat with conventional, chemical, or biological weapons (CBW). Taking into consideration the unquestionable conventional superiority of the United States, conventional weapons could provide an adequate response option in any of the above scenarios. However, a number of allies (such as the Baltic States or Israel) still believe that their neighbors could actually threaten their existence with non-nuclear means. In these cases, US extended **nuclear deterrence** and calculated ambiguity are considered crucial to prevent such an attack. Therefore, declaring a sole purpose posture under the current circumstances would be seen by some allies as a **weakening of US commitments**. This, however, does not mean that the Trump administration should renounce sole purpose. It should, in fact, recommit to sole purpose as a long-term goal because it would be a demonstration of its intention to live up to its NPT commitments by reducing the role of nuclear weapons in the future. Just as during the 2010 NPT Review Conference, this could strengthen US negotiating positions at the 2020 RevCon by alleviating criticism from the non-nuclear weapon states.

### L - Cyber

#### **Developing cyber capabilities and OCOs raises questions over the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence**

Vizier 21 (Soléne Vizier - holds a double Master's degree in Strategic Studies from the University of Paris and in Cybersecurity, Cyberterrorism and Cyberwarfare from the INISEG (Spain), “New Technologies and Nuclear Strategy”, IDN, November 2021, <https://www.idn-france.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/IDN-New-technologies-and-nuclear-strategy-VDef.pdf>, MG)

States’ cyber capabilities are changing the composition of conventional and nuclear weapons systems, and challenging the **principle of "nuclear deterrence**".

While new technologies support system functionality, real-time decision-making and data processing, new computers and complex codes also make systems less secure, more difficult to protect and therefore easier to compromise. Increased reliance on increasingly complex information systems for nuclear operations increases the possibility of errors, failures and accidents. Similarly, the increasing use of commercial technologies creates significant risks. For example, several nuclear-weapon states rely on commercial technologies and components procured abroad for sensitive nuclear operations, because they are unable to manufacture high-tech components and computer chips.

The development of cyber capabilities also has a **transformative effect** on other weapons systems. The development of smart weapons, such as ballistic missile defences or satellite weapons, will have an impact on **nuclear thinking and strategies**. These new technologies may offer opportunities for "deterrence by denial": designed to intercept missiles or warheads after launch, they can also be used to prevent nuclear weapons systems from functioning as intended. This raises important questions for nuclear security, thinking and strategy: the ability of states to target adversary targets vulnerable to missile shields, the role of advanced technologies as a non-nuclear counterforce, the risks of dual-use technologies, the use of artificial intelligence (AI), etc. While AI can assist in decision-making, the RAND Corporation points to its powerful destabilizing potential. AI will strengthen the intelligence capabilities of the most advanced states, weakening "nuclear deterrence" and accelerating decision-making in nuclear crises.

Thus, the new cyber threat poses significant risks to the very **principle of "nuclear deterrence**". As a key element of future conflicts, **offensive cyber capabilities**, which give the advantage to the attacker rather than the defender, will **increase tensions** in times of crisis and could have important consequences for strategic stability, **requiring a radical rethinking** of established nuclear concepts.

The risks to nuclear command-and-control systems and to information and early warning systems could render the nuclear order inoperative in a crisis. In the case of both AI and cyber-attacks, the mere existence of such means of attack could **undermine confidence** in nuclear weapons systems and **call into question** the nuclear second-strike capability. Fear of losing the ability to retaliate could make states feel so vulnerable that they might be tempted to take pre-emptive action. These risks are heightened by the fact that several of the nuclear-weapon states maintain their nuclear forces on permanent alert, and launch times are becoming increasingly shorter. The development of offensive cyber capabilities could thus disrupt the traditional scale of escalation: states could be made vulnerable at any time by their enemies – state or non-state – and a “permanent state of rivalry” would be created.

According to Futter, these developments could have serious consequences for nuclear deterrence based on second-strike capability and the fear of mutually assured destruction. The potential use of cyber capabilities as precursors to delay or disrupt defensive systems before conducting a strategic attack introduces the risk that systems could be compromised and therefore not function as intended. States would then reintroduce the possibility of preemptive strikes against nuclear weapons or associated systems.

These cyber capabilities will also have an impact on the likelihood of a future nuclear arms reduction agreement, as well as on **nuclear proliferation**, because any arms reduction agreement could increase the influence of cyber threats. Cyber weapons thus represent a serious and growing counterforce risk and create a cyber security dilemma in terms of which nuclear-weapon states must assume that their national security infrastructure has been targeted. This leads to a growing incentive for these states to adapt their nuclear policies towards "preventive deterrence" based on "deterrence by denial" rather than "deterrence by punishment". The sanctity of nuclear norms is thus being entirely reassessed, raising fears of a lowering of the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons.

#### **Europe perceives cyber replacement as an offensive tactic as less capable than nuclear**

Onderco and Zutt 21 (Michal Onderco PhD - Max Weber Fellow at the European University Institute, Madeline Zutt - research associate at Erasmus University Rotterdam, “Emerging technology and nuclear security: What does the wisdom of the crowd tell us?”, Contemporary Security Policy, 23 May 2021, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13523260.2021.1928963>, MG)

We were principally concerned with whether technologies that improve the discriminate and precise application of smart conventional weapons could **decrease reliance on nuclear weapons** for strategic tasks and even, perhaps, make the substitution of nuclear weapons (**by conventional capabilities) more feasible**. Experts and policymakers generally agreed that it is not likely that emerging technologies will substitute nuclear weapons in carrying out strategic tasks. However, among the experts whom we surveyed there was a slight variation depending on their region. Experts who were the most skeptical of cyber supplanting nuclear weapons in carrying out strategic tasks came from the United States, followed by those in Europe. By contrast, around 60% of those experts belonging to the category “Other” seemed to believe that cyber capabilities are likely to replace nuclear weapons in carrying out strategic tasks (see Table 2).

Decision-makers whom we interviewed tended to agree with experts from the United States and Europe. One interviewee reasoned that when it comes to trying to guarantee a strategic outcome, cyber is **not the best capability** because it is still far too complex and there is still much we do not know (Interviewee A). Another interviewee agreed saying that cyber is “**not designed to be a strategic weapon**” (Interviewee F). Other respondents agreed that new technologies are not likely to supplant nuclear weapons in carrying out strategic tasks simply because nuclear weapons have such a significant place in international politics and play such a pivotal, central role in deterrence. On this point, one interviewee remarked that the **very debate that we have** over nuclear weapons “is a **vindication of the importance of nuclear weapons** in politics and society” (Interviewee K). Another interviewee stated that the “horrifying stigma” around nuclear weapons evokes a certain respectability for the weapons as an effective deterrent (Interviewee L). This is particularly true when it comes to the role of nuclear weapons in deterrence by punishment, which elevates the costs of attack (Mazarr, 2018). Moreover, another policymaker stated that there is a conservative, doctrinal and institutional vision in their country that sees **nuclear weapons as essential** in the country’s strategic thinking, making it very difficult to “relativize their importance” (Interviewee D).

Policymakers generally agreed that the sheer destructiveness of nuclear weapons, which is—in the minds of experts and policy elites—assured and certain, makes them different from any other technology. These views come close to arguments outlined by Ford (2010), who argued that nuclear weapons are uniquely well-suited for both counterforce and countervalue targeting. Other experts, particularly those versed in cyber technology, pointed to a curious contradiction: The effectiveness of **offensive cyber weapons** is **unclear** unless they are tested, but as soon as they are used, the gaps they exploit might be patched up.

#### Shared cyber shifts US planning away from kinetic forces

Herr and Schneider 18, visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution, \*\* an assistant professor and affiliate faculty at the Center for Cyber Conflict Studies at the U.S. Naval War College (Trey and Jacquelyn, “Sharing is Caring: The United States’ New Cyber Commitment for NATO,” Council on Foreign Relations, https://www.cfr.org/blog/sharing-caring-united-states-new-cyber-commitment-nato)//BB

Treating cybersecurity capabilities more like conventional arms and less like national assets also helps drive the integration of cyber operations into the planning and execution of a broader array of conventional military missions. Early cyber operations were largely conventional espionage and surveillance activities supercharged by the spread of computing and the internet. In the United States, this led to the creation of large and complex software tools, carefully guarded by the intelligence community as national assets (sometimes unsuccessfully). The DoD’s announcement indicates a move towards treating at least some of these capabilities, along with their supporting infrastructure, more like conventional armaments and making them available for broader use; a model closer to Central or Special Operations Command and less like the National Security Agency. The Pentagon’s new commitment also reflects changes in how Europe talks about cybersecurity and characterizes the Russian threat. The last two years have seen a trend toward more open discussion of offensive cyber operations and the possibility of the alliance adopting more assertive postures to counter cyber operations against its members. After years of devastating ransomware attacks and cyber-enabled information attacks, NATO members are more willing to explore cyber triggers to Article 5. They have also been more willing to articulate the cyber threat against the alliance. In addition to last week’s denunciation by Dutch, UK, and U.S. authorities, Russian state actors are widely suggested to be responsible for an increasingly brazen series of operations, including targeting German government ministries, French and British TV stations, and more. Sharing offensive cyber capabilities raises the question of whether cyber operations can extend effective deterrence to NATO partners. There seems to be little focus on using these operations to deter conventional or nuclear attacks on NATO countries, but this may evolve. The United States seems to want NATO to use cyber operations to deter other cyber operations, particularly those falling under the threshold of armed conflict. Cyber operations have all sorts of problems for deterrence: signaling is difficult, they can be perceived as a cheap threat, and their effects are largely uncertain. By contrast, moving new military forces in Eastern Europe or conducting ground exercises are credible signals of extended deterrence, but are costly and time consuming. Cyber capabilities aren’t free, nor are they necessarily cheap, but the promise to use them can add new credibility to a deterrent threat without the same investment and delay as conventional alternatives. Sharing cyber capabilities may be a cheaper way to signal alliance commitment than other options and might signal a further maturation, and acceptance, of cybersecurity into geopolitics.

### L - Deescalation

#### **Pursuing deescalatory measures sends negative messages about assurance to allies**

Guillot 19 (W. Michael Guillot - retired USAF Colonel with experience in Strategic Air Command, “Why De-escalation Is Bad Policy”, Strategic Studies Quarterly, Volume 13 Number 3, Pages 3-4, Fall 2019, MG)

When leaders profess their desire to perpetually de-escalate provocations and crises, the message received by our adversaries is that the United States **lacks credibility** and fears confrontation. During the Korean and Vietnam Wars, the United States appeared too concerned about or fearful of escalation rather than showing conviction to solve a conflict on terms aligned with democratic interests and values. Recently, in response to Iran’s provocation, a senior US lawmaker stated that we must “do everything in our power to de-escalate.” The same sentiment was evident in former secretary of state John Kerry’s response to Russian actions in Syria. This fear of escalation is also seen in interactions between US Navy ships in the South China Sea and the so-called China maritime fleet, which signals weakness in “respect based” cultures. Another example is the US reaction to the situation in Ukraine. While this scenario continues to unfold, our initial response was to limit assistance to nonlethal aid for fear of escalation. In each of these examples, and many others, adversaries have learned to prey on US de-escalatory tendencies and rely on our timid reactions.

The result is a slow, insidious decline in perceived US credibility and resolve when it is confronted with clear violations of international law and threats of direct aggression. Some scholars argue that states should avoid confrontations that attempt to preserve their credibility while others argue in favor of it, particularly during noncrises. A policy of escalation helps preserve credibility to avoid fighting wars. But US credibility is not the only casualty of de-escalation as policy; it also affects US alliances.

A policy of de-escalation sends a **negative message to our allies about US assurances**—even more so than some current political messages. Such assurances are critical to the American alliance system, and research suggests that reliable nations make better alliance partners. We have seen examples of negative assurances in the past, particularly whether the United States would live up to its **nuclear commitments** during the Cold War. **Would we trade New York for Berlin**? Without assurances from the United States, **the system itself may well fracture**, allowing for more of the types of aggression ongoing in the Indo-Pacific and Eastern Europe. To be sure, there remains a risk of entanglement in a crisis created by allies, but being willing to escalate seems more likely to help prevent its occurrence.

Without a willingness to escalate, alliances become **meaningless commitments** and the world becomes **a more dangerous place**. In a recent Foreign Policy article, Eldridge Colby writes about the key to Chinese and Russian success in a great power conflict. His prescription: restraint by Washington. De-escalation is the culprit in what Colby describes as the “fait accompli.” Particularly in the Baltic States, de-escalation messages create doubt among our allies as to whether the United States considers escalation worth the risk, or cost. The same could be said for Chinese actions to forcefully reclaim Taiwan or control the sea-lanes of the Indo-Pacific.

Without question, the greatest problem with a policy of de-escalation is the impression it sends to our adversaries. Over the past few years, US policy makers have instinctively looked to de-escalate crises at all costs— from China to Syria to Iran. The result has been Russian aggression in Syria, Georgia, and Ukraine; Chinese island fortifications that threaten freedom of navigation; Iranian attacks in the Middle East; and North Korean threats in Southeast Asia. Thus, the very word escalation seems to have **created fear** among some US decision makers and scholars.

### L - Drones

#### **Drone cooperation exacerbates questions of assurance and creates risks of entrapment and aggression**

Mehta 19 (Rupal N. Mehta PhD - Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln, “Extended deterrence and assurance in an emerging technology environment”, Journal of Strategic Studies, 3 June 2019, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01402390.2019.1621173>, MG)

Despite these potential benefits, it is not immediately clear how allies are likely to respond to the incorporation of unmanned systems to their defence. Due in part of these characteristics (seen as advantageous to the US), allies may be less convinced of their utility. Unlike military personnel or hard forward-deployed assets which are much harder to redeploy, **drones can be shifted** to counter more prescient threats and potentially produce uncertainty among allies about US commitment. Second, as drones reduce the risk to US personnel, allies may, potentially incorrectly, view this as a **reduction in the US’s willingness to experience risk** in defence of its allies and partners. As concerns over ‘**risking Tokyo for New York’** persisted in the nuclear age, perceptions of risk and commitment as shifted by unmanned weapons systems may similarly exacerbate questions of assurance. From the allied perspective, the strength of the US commitment may increasingly be in doubt. Thus, we may find limited support for Hypothesis 3.

Further, uncertainty in the US commitment, as a result of emerging technology, has the opportunity to encourage **riskier behaviour** among allies. Concerns over moral hazard and agency loss persist in discussions of the nuclear umbrella and while generally seen to be lower than hypothesised, these concerns may grow in a new emerging technology environment where US credibility is seen to waver.56 Consider then how allies are likely to respond in this strategic engagement. Allies may invest in **more offensive capabilities** that could have important implications for conflict dynamics. Allies may seek to engage or deter adversaries on their own, potentially in contravention to broader alliance principles, and have the ability to involve or **entrap** the United States in undesirable conflicts.

In aggregate, an examination of the inclusion of drones in extended deterrence suggests that while attractive to American policymakers and civilians in defending allies, their use may produce unforeseen and potentially negative consequences in attempting to assure allies, revealing preliminary support for the hypotheses introduced earlier. The case vignette below similarly tracks these hypotheses in the context of hypersonic boostglide vehicles.

### L - Hypersonics

#### **Hypersonics cooperative development alienates allies and risks war with Russia and China**

Mehta 19 (Rupal N. Mehta PhD - Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln, “Extended deterrence and assurance in an emerging technology environment”, Journal of Strategic Studies, 3 June 2019, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01402390.2019.1621173>, MG)

However, in considering Hypothesis 2 – the potential benefit of emerging technology in deterring large-scale conflict but potentially inviting small-scale disputes – the emergence of hypersonic glide vehicles gets somewhat more complex. Despite the rhetoric and posture aimed at third parties (such as North Korea) that pose threats to its allies, the US’s two primary adversaries, Russia and China, view the **development** of CPGS and hypersonic weaponry as **destabilising**, prone to miscalculation, and potential escalation. This emerging technology may produce **more risk than deterrent value** and increase both the likelihood of smaller-scale crises, as well as large-scale conflicts.62

Importantly, it is this concern that highlights why allies may be less assured by the inclusion of this capability in the broader extended deterrent arsenal. Worried about being caught as collateral damage in a fight between major powers such as Russia and China against the United States, allies may fear that even conventional-only hypersonic vehicles may **increase the risk of conflict** to unacceptable levels – producing uncertainty about whether they would actually be used in combat. This concern about the actual likelihood of use mirrors that in the conversations over nuclear use. Most allies are uncertain as to whether the United States would actually invoke nuclear weapons in their defence for fear of escalation.63 If hypersonic glide vehicles produce the same cycles of miscalculation, strategic instability and uncertainty, they are unlikely to serve as useful complements to extended deterrence.64

Second, if we consider this dynamic from the opposing perspective, allies may be concerned about the efficacy and credibility of the US extended deterrent, in the context of hypersonic weaponry. In contrast to the United States whose development of hypersonic vehicles is primarily conventional, both Russia and China are projected to have ‘upped the ante’ by developing capabilities for nuclear delivery as well.65 Allied observers of this progress may be increasingly concerned about the asymmetry between the US capability and that of its two significant adversaries. As with other forms of uncertainty, allies may again begin to question their reliance on US’s extended deterrent, and potentially **seek their own offensive capabilities** to counter these new threats. Further, uncertainty about escalation management may encourage other forms of behaviour that diverge from alliance preferences. These dynamics may produce negative repercussions for broader regional and international stability – namely by encouraging allies to take up riskier behaviour that **increases the likelihood of conflict**. As with other instances of moral hazard in the nuclear arena, there are concerns that allies may effectively threaten efforts at strategic stability.

As both vignettes illustrate, through preliminary examinations of the four hypotheses discussed earlier, the introduction of emerging technologies into the extended deterrence and assurance equation produces a whole host of complex and unforeseen implications. Seemingly non-uniform in their broader effects, more research is required to assess how exactly these technologies may enhance the US’s ability to provide deterrence to distant allies, while still maintaining credibility in its commitments.

### L – SC – Troop Reduction

#### Security cooperation with NATO is used domestically to justify troop reductions

Bushey 17, J.D., SUNY Buffalo Law School, Buffalo, New York, 2007 (Adam, “GOVERNANCE: THE MISSING INGREDIENT IN SECURITY COOPERATION,” <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1038564.pdf)//BB>

It is a U.S. government held position that SC/SA programs reduce the need for U.S. boots on the ground during conflicts.28 After host nation forces are trained, U.S. partners have greater capacity and independence, which reduces the need for the presence of U.S. soldiers. During the Cold War, there were “over half a million U.S. personnel assigned in the European theater.”29 Today, the U.S. commitment has been reduced by more than 85 percent. 30 This is, in part, due to the existence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the military posture of allied forces in the region, thereby reducing the need for a massive U.S. force. As Congress enacts end-strength reductions for all of the services, the goal is to build partner capacity to “operate alongside or instead of U.S. military forces.”31

#### Troop withdrawal triggers assurance collapse

Alexander Lanoszka 19, assistant professor of international relations at the University of Waterloo and an honorary fellow at City, University of London, 6-11-2019, "False Alarm? Donald Trump, Alliances and Nuclear Proliferation," East West, https://www.eastwest.ngo/idea/false-alarm-donald-trump-alliances-and-nuclear-proliferation

Some observers argue the prospects for nuclear proliferation among U.S. allies appear to have heightened in recent years. Superficially, U.S. President Donald Trump may be responsible. During his 2016 presidential campaign, he made statements suggesting he might tolerate efforts by Japan and South Korea to acquire nuclear weapons. His criticisms of NATO and some of its members have fueled debate in Germany on the desirability and feasibility of the “nuclear option.” Looking more broadly, since the 2008 financial crisis, the U.S. has had to grapple with the management of its security ties abroad amid mounting budgetary deficits and growing public weariness of so-called “forever wars.” And yet, over two years into the Trump administration, little nuclear proliferation-related activity seems to be taking place among U.S. allies. In fact, some of the most powerful U.S. allies—Japan and Germany—have largely moved away from nuclear energy. What lies behind this current scenario? Perhaps one answer is that the U.S military deployments that underscore U.S. security commitments remain strong. But how do security guarantees relate to nuclear proliferation? Presidential rhetoric may be important for evaluating the strength of a treaty pledge by the U.S. to defend an ally in the event of attack by a potential adversary like Russia, North Korea or China. However, whether it is more important than other considerations is debatable, since presidential rhetoric may simply be just that: rhetoric. A verbally cited promise to follow through on any pledges recorded in print is simply hard to believe. No country wants to risk the safety of his or her country’s cities for an ally, if they can help it. How can a state, therefore, have any sort of confidence in its alliances? Thankfully, there is a way. The U.S. deploys a wide range of military forces to shore up local defense and deterrence measures to augment the security of its allies and to advance its own national security interests. U.S. forces stationed in South Korea and Japan, for example, are there for regional contingency if North Korea and/or China were to commit an act of aggression—not to serve as potential targets to trigger wider retaliation by Washington, per the logic of trip-wires. They are also there to kill, making it hard for any potential aggressor to go successfully on the attack without incurring unacceptable costs. So long as the U.S. has such forces on its ally’s territory, or in the theater of operations where a potential war would be fought, the security guarantee is sufficiently strong to have the confidence of its beneficiaries. It is when the U.S. has unilaterally reduced its forward deployments that its allies become so alarmed they are tempted to acquire nuclear weapons to ensure their own security. A case in point is South Korea in the 1970s. As it does now, South Korea benefited from a treaty promising that Washington would defend it against external aggression. But when President Richard Nixon came into office in 1969, he spoke of how partners in East Asia and elsewhere would need to bear more of the collective defense burden, especially in light of its failures in Vietnam, rising anti-war sentiment at home and the downturn in the U.S. economy. Yet, the South Korean President at the time—Park Chung-hee—was unfazed by Nixon’s rhetoric. He believed that the United States would reward his country for its contributions in the Vietnam War by retaining its large military presence on the Korean Peninsula. President Park’s optimism was misplaced. In July 1970, Nixon announced that the U.S. would unilaterally withdraw 20,000 of its military personnel from South Korea within a year, cutting the total U.S. military presence on the peninsula by one-third. The balance of power implications were potentially significant. Since more troop reductions were now conceivable, South Korea would become newly vulnerable to North Korea—an adversary that, at the time, was relatively more industrialized, enjoyed Chinese and Soviet patronage, had a stronger conventional military and had engaged in highly provocative but low-level military activities across the Demilitarized Zone against the South since 1966. Against this backdrop, President Park put South Korea on the path towards acquiring nuclear weapons. This project failed partly because South Korea needed outside sources for credit and access to reprocessing and enrichment facilities—a vulnerability that the United States used to its advantage to get its ally to curb its activities and to make nonproliferation commitments. Still, South Korea has had persistent interest in fissile materials since the 1970s and continues to undertake continued pyroprocessing activities. Today, South Korea may not be on an aggressive path to acquiring nuclear weapons, but its apparent desire to seek some advantage demonstrates that security guarantees—once broken—can be very difficult to repair, thus prompting countries to reconsider the nuclear option. The South Korean case illuminates why we are seeing no new efforts to get nuclear weapons, at least by U.S. treaty allies, in the age of Trump. When one looks beyond the rhetoric, actions speak volumes. The Trump administration has reinforced U.S. force posture with additional deployments to Germany. It is seriously considering a permanent military presence in neighboring Poland. Present relations with South Korea have been rocky, but the Trump administration did sign an updated free trade agreement, as well as a temporary agreement, to help cover the costs of 28,500 military personnel stationed there. The U.S. military presence in Japan has remained steady. Indeed, if Trump is serious about containing China, the U.S. military presence will likely increase in East Asia over the long-term. Dramatic, unilateral troop withdrawals under the Trump administration are still possible, but the historical record indicates that such attempts are generally made early in a presidency rather than later. Nixon, for instance, announced his troop withdrawal out of Vietnam within eighteen months of coming into office. Putting all rhetoric aside, if the military foundations of U.S. security guarantees remain strong, nuclear proliferation among allies remains unlikely.

### L - DoD Tradeoff

#### Funding for US nuclear modernization is stable now

Bryan Bender, staff at Politico, January 12, 2022

“Biden team weighs killing Trump’s new nuclear weapons: Officials are considering canceling weapons that were backed by the last administration.,” Politico, <https://www.politico.com/news/2022/01/12/biden-trump-nuclear-weapons-526976>, (accessed 4-26-2022)

But the final deliberations are coming into view. “I think we’ll probably see, certainly, a shift back towards the tone and tenor of the 2010 NPR,” said retired Air Force Lt. Gen. Frank Klotz, who co-authored a new study on the nuclear triad for the government-funded RAND Corp. But that also likely means sticking to the major overhaul of the nuclear triad that was underwritten in the Obama administration and is estimated to cost $634 billion over the next decade. The Trump administration added to that modernization push by authorizing at least three new weapon systems and upgraded warheads, including a cruise missile and a smaller warhead for subs. Critics argue such less destructive weapons are more destabilizing because they are more likely to be used in a conflict than weapons that can obliterate entire cities. Biden, however, has been under pressure from some Democrats in Congress to reconsider the development of the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent, which is set to replace the Minuteman III ICBMs that are located in underground silos across five Western states. The administration decided to forgo a request from the offices of Sens. Jeff Merkley (D-Ore.) and Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) to study whether the current missiles could be operated longer, according to a pair of congressional staffers. A Pentagon-ordered unclassified study on the future of the ICBM force commissioned by the Pentagon last month isn’t expected to recommend major changes to the missile replacement program, which was awarded to Northrop Grumman in 2020. “I don’t think it’s going to be Earth-shattering in any way,” said George Perkovich, vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the lead author of the study. The Biden nuclear review is also not expected to propose changes to the development of a new fleet of Columbia-class ballistic missile submarines under construction by General Dynamics, or the B-21 stealth bomber also being built by Northrop Grumman. “Many of the same programs, many of the same policies will remain the same,” predicted Klotz, who ran the National Nuclear Security Administration at the Department of Energy, which builds the nuclear warheads, from 2014 to 2018. He said he expects “some changes on the margin to indicate they have looked seriously at [potential reforms], but I expect the fundamental tenets of the nuclear modernization program to continue pretty much as they have since they were first conceived in the Obama administration.”

#### Security Cooperation squanders finite resources needed for other military projects

Peter Munson, senior vice president for preventive services and global crisis management for a private sector corporation and a retired U.S. Marine Corps officer, 2013

“The Limits of Security Cooperation,” War on the Rocks, <https://warontherocks.com/2013/09/the-limits-of-security-cooperation/>, (accessed 5-16-2022)

SC does work to build capacity in certain, relatively elite units that perceive a real need for improvement and hard training. Likewise, it works to build interoperability between already-capable partner forces and U.S. and coalition militaries. SC in the right doses can be a good way of showing solidarity with allies against other regional threats. But SC [Security Cooperation] is not a panacea and must be applied with significantly more discernment than the usual some-is-good-more-is-better logic of U.S. military spending. Planners should go to great lengths to ensure that SC is seen as a tool for a specific purpose, not a reward to condition behaviors. SC-as-a-conditioning-tool becomes bribery with diminishing returns. If policymakers want a quid pro quo, they need to admit as much and use much more precisely targeted incentives: paying a fee for access or head-of-the-line transit privileges for example. This becomes a much more predictable business transaction than trying to use SC funds, winks, and nudges to get one’s way. Finally, in the land of perverse incentives, SC is often seen as a means to drive defense business to U.S. contractors. This is true. By creating arms races and supplying prestige weapons, however useless, to unstable areas of the world, they are creating U.S. jobs. But wouldn’t taxpayer money and efforts be better spent if officials more precisely targeted domestic concerns with taxpayer funds rather than hoping that efforts trickle down predictably from collaboration with corpulent and unsavory foreign generals? In the land of perverse incentives, SC funding is one of the most egregious—and in the post-9/11 era, many officials see SC as a critical tool of strategic positioning. However, the premises of SC must be reconsidered before the U.S. military squanders more resources on white elephant projects.

#### Spending tradeoffs are most likely to come from US nuclear modernization

Bryan Bender, staff at Politico, January 12, 2022

“Biden team weighs killing Trump’s new nuclear weapons: Officials are considering canceling weapons that were backed by the last administration.,” Politico, <https://www.politico.com/news/2022/01/12/biden-trump-nuclear-weapons-526976>, (accessed 4-26-2022)

But national security officials are debating whether to jettison a new nuclear-armed cruise missile now in the research phase, retire a Cold War-era thermonuclear bomb, and possibly even remove a new “low-yield” warhead that the previous administration deployed on submarines, the current and former officials said. Most spoke on condition they not be identified in order to discuss internal deliberations and private conversations. Such changes would fall short of the overhaul of nuclear policy and programs that President Joe Biden has long argued would help blunt a nuclear arms race, namely a declaration that the United States would not be the first to strike an adversary using atomic weapons. Yet halting the Trump-era “add-ons,” as they are called, are considered the most likely cuts if Biden wants to reverse the previous administration’s elevation of nuclear weapons in U.S. strategy, due to resistance from military leaders to big changes as Russia and China build up their arsenals. “The Biden administration’s problem or challenge, of course, is how can it show that it is doing something on reductions or reforms without undercutting the modernization program that was set in motion by [former President Barack] Obama,” said Hans Kristensen, director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists. He said some of the newer weapons approved by former President Donald Trump are “the low-hanging fruit,” particularly a new nuclear-armed cruise missile for the Navy.

#### Triggers allied proliferation

Matthew Kroenig, Deputy Director, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, September 23, 2021

“The special role of US nuclear weapons,” The Atlantic Council, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/the-special-role-of-us-nuclear-weapons/>, (accessed 5-17-2022)

US nuclear weapons play a special role in underpinning international peace, global security, and the US-led, rules-based international system. The nuclear threat to the United States and its democratic allies is growing: nuclear-armed, revisionist, autocratic powers (Russia, China, and North Korea) are relying more on nuclear weapons in their strategies, and they are modernizing and expanding their arsenals. In this new issue brief, the Scowcroft Center’s Matthew Kroenig explains why the United States needs to retain a robust, flexible, and modernized nuclear force to meet its national security objectives. US nuclear weapons are special for three reasons US nuclear weapons are unique for three reasons. First, the United States extends nuclear deterrence to more than thirty formal treaty allies in Europe and the Indo-Pacific, a central pillar of US alliances and the rules-based international system. Second, US counterforce targeting keeps the United States in compliance with the Law of Armed Conflict and potentially allows the United States to limit the damage from nuclear war and save millions of lives. Finally, the United States has enjoyed the economic capacity to field a robust nuclear force at a reasonable cost. In sum, the United States demands more of its nuclear weapons than other countries and requires a more robust force. The international security environment is deteriorating The United States’ three nuclear-armed adversaries—Russia, China, and North Korea—are all modernizing and expanding their nuclear arsenals while consistently relying more on nuclear weapons in their defense strategies. Even as it complies with the letter of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), the Kremlin is building new, exotic and battlefield weapons not covered in the Treaty’s text. China’s rise has paved the way for its assertive and revisionist foreign policy, which poses the greatest threat to US national security and the US-led, rules-based international system. China’s nuclear forces may double within the next decade, or even triple or quadruple. North Korea has become the third US adversary with the ability to hold the US homeland at risk with the threat of nuclear war.

## Mechanics

### **I/L – US Commitment Key**

#### **Nuclear prolif is thinkable, and it’s entirely contingent on an absolute assurance that the US will provide extended nuclear deterrence**

Hagel et al. 21 (Chuck Hagel - former US Secretary of Defense, Malcolm Rifkind - former UK Foreign Secretary and Secretary of Defense, Kevin Rudd - former Australian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, “Preventing Nuclear Proliferation and Reassuring America’s Allies”, The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 8 February 2021, <https://www.thechicagocouncil.org/sites/default/files/2021-02/report_preventing-nuclear-proliferation-reassuring-americas-allies.pdf>, MG)

All security partnerships between unequal partners are characterized by a dual dynamic of deterrence and reassurance. The dominant ally needs to take actions that deter the adversary and reassure its weaker ally. Of the two, reassurance is often more difficult than deterrence, especially when the dynamic plays out in the nuclear realm. For while the adversary may be deterred by even a small chance that conflict escalates to nuclear confrontation, the ally will be reassured **only** if it believes there is a high likelihood that the stronger partner will come to its defense. In other words, because its security is dependent on the actions of another power, an ally will always worry about its possible abandonment in time of need.

The changing security environment characterized by **Russia’s return, China’s rise, North Korea’s advance, and America’s retreat** accentuates the deterrence-reassurance dilemma in a new form for America’s European and Asian allies. For the first time in decades, it raises new challenges for the long-ignored nuclear dimension of their security relationships. Although renewed discussions about nuclear deterrence and reassurance have so far played out largely beyond public view inmost allied countries, the issue is becoming increasingly salient as the perceived threats to security have increased. The United States and its allies **cannot ignore that reality**. For if we are to prevent **new nuclear proliferation** among these allies, it is essential to acknowledge that what has long been unthinkable is becoming **thinkable once more**.

#### **The US’ commitment credibility specifically is the brightline for potential proliferators**

Mehta 20 (Rupal N. Mehta PhD - Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln, “Delaying Doomsday”, Bridging the Gap, Page 53-54, 2020, MG)

Second, questions of credibility and reputation have resurged in the modern geo-strategic era.60 Decline in U.S.  reputation in the twenty-first century has been **exacerbated** after a series of foreign policy failures (e.g., the Iraq War in 2003, the creation of failed redlines in Syria in 2013), and potentially worse, the idiosyncratic “America First” foreign policy of the Trump Administration that even extols the **benefits of nuclear proliferation**. If adversaries and allies alike **mistrust** the United States and its commitment to both the nonproliferation regime and existing alliances, concerns will continue to escalate about whether the U.S. would be willing to **actually abide by a nuclear agreement** and provide the promised inducements from negotiations or forgo threats of military force if the proliferator actually complies. If proliferators or other actors in the international community doubt the United States’ credibility, **proliferators** on the cusp of nuclear reversal may question whether they should proceed with their planned denuclearization. Future research may choose to relax these assumptions and assess whether the same theoretical mechanisms are as salient in a new geopolitical environment where state (and specifically leader) credibility is up to debate.

Role of Non-U.S. Actors: Other Superpowers and Regional Adversaries

The theoretical framework in this book focuses primarily on the role of the United States as the key actor involved in nuclear negotiations. This is not without reason. First, its role as the **head of the nonproliferation** (and thus counterproliferation) regime is generally unequivocal. Since the introduction of nuclear weapons in the international system in 1945 (by the United States), the U.S. scientific and policy communities, as well as policymakers and heads of states, have done their utmost to both manage and curtail the spread of nuclear technology throughout the international system.61 Second, as discussed throughout this study, the United States has traditionally been both the **primary donor** of positive inducements and imposer of sanctions and other negative inducements. This is true not just within the nuclear arena but often with regard to human rights violations, terrorism, or other security threats posed by external adversaries. Third, and relatedly, the United States, **as the global hegemon**, often has the most to lose from proliferation challenges to the status quo. As leader of the international world order, threats posed by proliferators to adapt or alter “the nuclear club” hold significant costs for the U.S., both in terms of security and with regard to its interests globally.62

### I/L – Nuke Commitment Key

#### **US Nuclear-based commitment is the only one that assures allies – anything else enables proliferation**

Anderson et al. 13 (Justin V. Anderson PhD - Senior Policy Fellow at National Defense University's Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Jeffrey A. Larsen PhD - Research Professor in the Department of National Security Affairs, US Naval Postgraduate School, Polly M. Holdorf - Program Support Specialist at the United States Air Force Academy , “Extended Deterrence and Allied Assurance: Key Concepts and Current Challenges for U.S. Policy”, INSS Occasional Paper, <https://www.usafa.edu/app/uploads/OCP69.pdf>, September 2013, MG)

Extending deterrence against regional risk-taking states in possession of limited nuclear arsenals – or determined to develop these weapons – requires the United States to clearly demonstrate it possesses **nuclear forces** capable of imposing “unacceptable costs” against any actor contemplating a nuclear attack against a U.S. ally or partner.64 While each leg of the U.S. nuclear triad possesses this capability, **nuclear-capable** aircraft (bombers and dual-capable aircraft (DCA)) are particularly important to extended deterrence against this type of opponent. In response to nuclear saber-rattling by a risk-taking state with a limited nuclear arsenal, the United States can rapidly fly these delivery systems into the region in question, showing this state – and local U.S. allies – that it can immediately respond to any provocation with superior nuclear capabilities.65

U.S. nuclear forces are also **essential** to the assurance of allies and partners. Other than the United Kingdom and France, no U.S. ally or partner openly possesses their own nuclear arsenal. As a result, many allies and partners are entirely dependent upon the United States for the provision of a nuclear deterrent against potential adversaries armed with nuclear weapons. The importance of this fact – which is a day-to-day reality for many U.S. friends abroad – cannot be overemphasized; for these states, the **only weapon** they view as fully effective against nuclear coercion or attack is not in their possession.66 This highlights the importance of the U.S. “nuclear umbrella” to **nuclear nonproliferation efforts**; it is vital for the United States to convince allies and partners they have **no need** to consider developing their own, independent nuclear deterrent.67

Within the U.S. nuclear arsenal, allies and partners particularly value visible and mobile U.S. nuclear forces.68 As noted above, within current U.S. nuclear forces these characteristics are associated with nuclear-capable aircraft. U.S. allies and partners recognize the United States can also deliver nuclear payloads globally with submarinelaunched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Many find greater assurance, however, in forces they can **directly observe stationed or forward deployed** on their territory, or regularly rotating in theater. They also share the U.S. conviction that the rapid, visible generation or deployment of U.S. nuclear forces can prevent nuclear-armed potential adversaries from engaging in nuclear brinkmanship.

Planners and strategists must demonstrate to allies, partners, and potential adversaries that U.S. nuclear forces are not solely restricted to central deterrence. Potential adversaries must also recognize that the United States is capable of rapidly matching any type of nuclear provocation or escalation. In addition, U.S. strategists and planners need to balance allied requests for nuclear forces sufficient to deter and defeat prospective opponents against allied concerns regarding the potential consequences of nuclear conflict (such as fallout drifting across their borders). At present, due to the threats posed by risk-taker states, the role of nuclear airpower is critically important to a range of U.S. extended deterrence and assurance strategies. As such, strategists and planners must understand the unique (and differing) capabilities and requirements of bombers, DCA, and the warheads they can deliver.

#### **Only nuclear solves deterrence and assurance**

Wheeler 10 (Michael O. Wheeler – Colonel and Staff Secretary to the National Security Council, “The Changing Requirements of Assurance and Extended Deterrence”, Institute for Defense Analysis, July 2010, <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA550264.pdf>, MG)

Background. When this project began in 2007, it was not common practice to encounter American officials publicly discussing assurance and extended deterrence. In fact, as nuclear security became less of a central feature of great power relations after the Cold War, it was unusual to encounter much discussion of any nuclear deterrence issues at high levels of government. Today, however, the nuclear dimension of extended deterrence is a much more highly visible part of the security debate, and figures prominently in statements by cabinet officials and, indeed, by the Vice President and President. The following elements of the evolving policy environment since the project began are especially relevant to this paper.

The Schlesinger Task Force. An unauthorized transfer of nuclear weapons by the Air Force in 2007 and the subsequent discovery that intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) components had been shipped to Taiwan by mistake a year earlier, triggered a series of investigations and reports. In June 2008, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates appointed the Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Management chaired by James R. Schlesinger to recommend improvements and measures to enhance deterrence and international confidence in the U.S. nuclear deterrent.

**The Schlesinger task force** produced two reports.9 Among other things, the task force concluded that U.S. nuclear capabilities in Europe, although modest in numbers, remain a “**pillar of NATO** [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] unity.”10 The task force also stressed the importance of **extended nuclear deterrence** as a non-proliferation tool. In a press conference at the Pentagon in January 2008, Dr. Schlesinger stated that, 11 the United States is obligated to provide a nuclear umbrella for 30-plus nations, and that number may increase. Thus, those 30 nations must retain confidence in the U.S. nuclear umbrella. If they fail to do so, some **five or six** of those nations are quite capable of beginning to produce nuclear weapons on their own, and the consequence is to add to proliferation. The strength of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, the credibility of that umbrella, is a **principal barrier to proliferation**.

This has become a standard, non-partisan theme in the contemporary American security policy debate.

**The Perry-Schlesinger Commission**. Under the chairmanship of two former Secretaries of Defense, William J. Perry and James R. Schlesinger, the Strategic Posture Commission (also known as the Perry-Schlesinger Commission) was chartered by Congress in 2008 to examine and make recommendations on the long-term strategic posture of the United States. In their final report, released in early 2009, the Posture Commission provided a broad and comprehensive analysis of the international nuclear order. The Commission concluded inter alia that assuring allies remains a principal function of the U.S nuclear posture and that the United States should expand consultations with allies regarding such assurances.12 The Commission also found that “assurance that extended deterrence remains credible and effective may require that the United States retain numbers or types of **nuclear capabilities** that it might not deem necessary if it were concerned **only with its own defense**.”13 Finally, relevant to this discussion, the Commission also concluded that the United States “should adapt its strategic posture to the evolving requirements of deterrence, extended deterrence, and assurance.”14

**The Perry-Scowcroft Task Force**. In 2008, the Council on Foreign Relations convened an independent task force chaired by William J. Perry and Brent Scowcroft to examine U.S. nuclear weapons policy. In their consensus report released in 2009, the Perry-Scowcroft task force concluded inter alia: The United States does not need nuclear weapons to compensate for conventional military inferiority and has no reason to fear a conventionally armed foe. But **U.S. allies, including members of the NA TO alliance**, Australia, Japan, and South Korea, depend on security assurances from the United States. A component of these assurances is **protection against nuclear attack**. U.S. nuclear weapons represent one facet of multilayered defenses—including diplomacy, economic support, and conventional military forces—that deter attacks and defend allies in the event of an attack. Without the nuclear aspect of these assurances, some U.S. allies may decide in the future to acquire nuclear weapons. The Task Force strongly supports maintaining and enhancing, where necessary, U.S. security assurances to allies (emphasis added).

#### **Only the nuclear deterrence aspect of assurance prevents proliferation**

Trachtenberg 12 (David J. Trachtenberg - American national security advisor who served as principal deputy under secretary for policy in the United States Department of Defense, “US Extended Deterrence: How Much Strategic Force Is Too Little?”, Strategic Studies Quarterly Volume 6 Number 2, Summer 2012, <https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-06_Issue-2/summer12.pdf>, MG)

The Bush administration’s 2001 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) postulated a world of extant and emerging nuclear powers posing qualitatively different nuclear threats to the United States and its allies than existed during the Cold War. While deterrence of nuclear attack remained a **central goal** of US nuclear forces, its nuclear arsenal was considered to play a broader role in ensuring global security.

Along with traditional deterrence, the 2001 NPR articulated a role for nuclear weapons in “assurance, dissuasion, and defeat”—concepts previously posited in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review. In other words, the NPR acknowledged that **US nuclear forces** play a major role in providing security guarantees to friends and allies who lack their own nuclear weapons and face challenges from hostile neighbors or adversaries (i.e., assurance). The US nuclear potential was also seen as having a dissuasive effect on adversaries who might contemplate actions contrary to American interests. And, of course, should deterrence fail—an increasingly plausible prospect in a world of rogue states and terrorist actors—US nuclear forces **must have** the capacity to defeat any aggressor. Without this capacity, the credibility of the US nuclear deterrent might be called into question, undermining the central deterrence goal of its nuclear forces.

This article focuses on the assurance aspect of US nuclear forces— helping to assure friends and allies of the American commitment to their security. There are many ways to assure friends and allies, and not all rely on threatening potential aggressors with nuclear destruction. These can include declaratory policy, creating or strengthening mutual defense agreements and military alliances, fostering broader political relationships, bolstering reliance on missile defenses, and the forward deployment of conventional forces.1

None of these means is mutually exclusive, and a sound policy of assurance will deploy all of them, as appropriate, tailored to specific circumstances. Nevertheless, it is the **nuclear deterrence aspect** of assurance which is being questioned more widely as nuclear force levels are reduced and which is the focus of this article.

Importantly, the requirements for extended deterrence and assurance may not be identical. An adversary may be deterred from attacking an ally even though that ally does not perceive its security to be adequately “assured.” Therefore, in some cases, the requirements for assurance may exceed those of deterrence. Clearly, the answer to the question How much is enough (or too little)? depends on the perception of both allies and adversaries.2

In light of growing threats to the United States posed by the **proliferation of nuclear** and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities to potential adversaries, the efficacy of security guarantees also depends on how allies perceive US willingness to defend their security if doing so risks exposing the US homeland to direct attack.

#### **Failing to uphold nuclear commitments to the highest degree causes nuclear proliferation cascades**

Trachtenberg 12 (David J. Trachtenberg - American national security advisor who served as principal deputy under secretary for policy in the United States Department of Defense, “US Extended Deterrence: How Much Strategic Force Is Too Little?”, Strategic Studies Quarterly Volume 6 Number 2, Summer 2012, <https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-06_Issue-2/summer12.pdf>, MG)

For a number of states, their own security rests on the viability and credibility of **US nuclear assurances**. Without the assurance—or reassurance—that this nuclear umbrella provides, these states may pursue their **own nuclear weapons acquisition** programs. As one observer noted, “For allies such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, and some NATO states, the stability both of the US deterrent and extended deterrence guarantees are a significant part of these countries’ own strategic calculus.”5 Indeed, there have been numerous studies in recent years suggesting “the credibility and reliability of US nuclear assurances are necessary to keep countries . . . from reconsidering their decisions to be nonnuclear states.”6

In a 2007 study that linked US extended deterrence with nonproliferation, the State Department’s International Security Advisory Board (ISAB) concluded, “Nuclear umbrella security agreements, whether unilateral or multilateral, have been, and are expected to continue to be, effective deterrents to proliferation.”7 The ISAB report stated, “There is clear evidence in diplomatic channels that US assurances to include the nuclear umbrella have been, and **continue to be, the single most important reason many allies have foresworn nuclear weapons**,” and further suggested that “a lessening of the US nuclear umbrella could very well trigger a [**nuclear proliferation] cascade in East Asia and the Middle East**.”8

Former secretary of defense Robert Gates acknowledged the importance of US nuclear weapons to extended deterrence and nonproliferation. In a 2008 speech to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, he declared, “As long as others have nuclear weapons, we must maintain some level of these weapons ourselves to deter potential adversaries and to reassure over two dozen allies and partners who rely on our nuclear umbrella for their security, making it unnecessary for them to develop their own.”9

In 2009, the bipartisan Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States concluded, “The US nuclear posture must be designed to address a very broad set of US objectives, including not just deterrence of enemies in time of crisis and war but also assurance of our allies and dissuasion of potential adversaries. Indeed, the assurance function of the force is as important as ever.”10

By some estimates, nearly 30 countries rely on the extended deterrent for the ultimate security US nuclear forces provide. Some of these countries are strong US allies that do not feel sufficiently threatened by neighbors or adversaries to contemplate developing nuclear weapons of their own. Others have been dissuaded from doing so as a result of formal defensive alliances with the United States (such as NATO). Still others are friends with which the United States does not have a formal defense relationship but whose security is nevertheless important to the maintenance of stability and defense of American interests; therefore, the nuclear umbrella has been extended to them.

Many of these countries can be found in dangerous or unstable regions with potentially hostile neighbors. If the US extended nuclear deterrent loses credibility, it is most likely to have significant repercussions among those states who may determine that their security is best served by **acquiring their own nuclear weapons** capability.

#### **Nuclear weapons must be the forefront in order to avoid existential dangers**

Trachtenberg 12 (David J. Trachtenberg - American national security advisor who served as principal deputy under secretary for policy in the United States Department of Defense, “US Extended Deterrence: How Much Strategic Force Is Too Little?”, Strategic Studies Quarterly Volume 6 Number 2, Summer 2012, <https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-06_Issue-2/summer12.pdf>, MG)

The issue of extended deterrence and the role of US nuclear forces in providing that deterrence to NATO is **not without controversy**. Nevertheless, it is clear a number of US, NATO, and non-NATO allies consider the US extended deterrent to be critical to their security.12 A group including former military chiefs of the United States, Britain, France, Germany, and the Netherlands reaffirmed the importance of the extended deterrent role of US nuclear forces and the credibility of nuclear escalatory threats by noting, “The first use of nuclear weapons **must remain** in the quiver of escalation as the ultimate instrument to prevent the use of weapons of mass destruction, in order to avoid truly **existential dangers**.”13

For some, the value of the extended deterrent lies in the deployment of American nuclear weapons on their territory and the demonstration of resolve these deployments convey. In these cases, additional US strategic offensive arms reductions may have less significance on allied perceptions of American credibility. For others, the value of extended deterrence lies more in the ability and willingness of the United States to maintain the effectiveness of its strategic nuclear arsenal. Therefore, additional strategic arms reductions may **undermine** the assurance value of American security guarantees.

In the past, some US allies have expressed strong views regarding the extended deterrent. These include non-NATO allies. For example, according to documents recently declassified by Japanese officials, concern over a possible Sino-US conflict in the mid 1960s led Prime Minister Sato Eisaku to press Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara for assurances the United States would be prepared to use its nuclear weapons against China.

### I/L – European Soil

#### **They have to be on European soil in order to be credible**

Audenaert 20 (Didier Audenaert - Senior Associate Fellow at the Egmont Institute, “Report Part Title: NATO’s nuclear role sharing: US nuclear weapon carried by European DCA”, Egmont Institute, 2020, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep28847.10.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A5975494adaef3139272fc055910ffad9&ab_segments=&origin=>, MG)

Current warfare operating procedures are likely to prioritise the use of stand-off weapons above gravity bombs. Consideration could therefore be given for relying entirely on the powerful and modern weapons in the US’ vast nuclear arsenal30 in fulfilling the role of “the supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies”. Of course, the quantity and the quality of the US’ nuclear arsenal is more than sufficient to ensure deterrence and defence. But, again, there is no consensus among Allies to change the present nuclear sharing modus operandi and arrangements. Overreliance on the US’ vast nuclear **territorial** arsenal would erase the Allies’ “broadest participation in nuclear burden sharing” as well as their interest and involvement in nuclear consultations: transatlantic collective security would be diluted and European Allies would **increasingly question American commitment** to European security; some European Allies could even start looking for **undesirable remedies**. Furthermore, the European Allies will not accept a sole and direct dependence on the US’ vast nuclear arsenal without having access to a collective (albeit smaller) **weapon on European soil** or a political say in the decision-making process which should be multilateral; one should not forget that the use of such nuclear weapons would be on the European continent. NATO’s nuclear sharing at least provides European Allies with a decision-making capability in the worst case. Furthermore, while Europe is not ready or capable of assuring her own deterrence and defence, there would be a very high risk of decoupling European and American security as the US would be far less critically involved in European security: the European ‘supreme layer’ would be non-existent and European Allies could be more easily exposed to coercion. One should recall that, historically, the US has created the mechanism of nuclear burden sharing with American nuclear weapons on European soil in order to meet European security concerns and to **prevent nuclear proliferation** on the European continent: these objectives have not changed.

It is clear that the political benefits of nuclear role sharing in the NATO framework outweigh the military limitations.

### I/L – AT: Norms Check

#### **Norms don’t check – newest ev**

Schepers 22 (Névine Schepers - a Senior Researcher in the Swiss and Euro-Atlantic Security Team at the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich, “Russia’s War and the Global Nuclear Order”, Volume 10 of Policy Perspectives, June 2022, <https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/PP10-6_2022-EN.pdf>, MG)

The global nuclear order is entering a phase of high volatility and increasing nuclear risks. An increased reliance on nuclear deterrence – not only by Russia but also by other nuclear powers – may **not lead** to expected proliferation cascades in the near future as long as US **security guarantees remain credible** to its allies. However, diminishing disarmament prospects and a loss of credibility of negative security assurances risk **polarizing the NPT** regime further between nuclear weapon states and states that benefit from their security guarantees on the one hand and non-nuclear weapon states on the other. Russia’s shift from a leading state within the global nuclear order to one that actively seeks to undermine its **norms and principles** will be difficult to manage in a context in which the NPT is already reeling from ongoing crises and a lack of consensus.

An absence of arms control dialogue between the United States and Russia for the foreseeable future also implies there will likely be **no successor to the New START** treaty by 2026. This would result in reduced transparency and predictability in terms of current strategic arsenals and no pathway for further reductions or addressing other issues affecting strategic stability. With less visibility into decision-making processes or force postures, and little to no dialogue occurring between Russia and the US or between Russia and NATO, transatlantic coordination will **remain key** in order to manage an increasingly unpredictable security environment through enhanced deterrence.

#### **History proves norms don’t resolve proliferation**

Green 18 (Matthew Green – Journalism Teacher at Fremont High School, “How to Stop a Nuclear War: The Non-Proliferation Treaty, Explained”, KQED, 21 March 2018, <https://www.kqed.org/lowdown/30398/how-to-stop-a-nuclear-war-the-non-proliferation-treaty-explained>, MG)

Despite the broad legal coverage of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), a string of failures since the early 1990s have highlighted the **limitations of existing nonproliferation instruments** to deter would-be nuclear weapon states. In theory, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) can refer countries that do not comply with the NPT to the UN Security Council (UNSC), which in turn can impose sanctions or other punitive measures. In practice, however, **political calculations** have often caused deadlock at the UNSC, enabling nuclear rogues such as Iran and North Korea to defy successive, fairly weak UN sanctions resolutions with virtual impunity. Multiple UNSC resolutions condemning these countries’ nuclear programs, including several that imposed sanctions, have **done little** to stem their nuclear ambitions. The outcome of the P5+1 negotiations to stem Iran’s nuclear program represents a major test for the nonproliferation regime’s ability to stop proliferation by states.

Another problem is the lack of adequate **verification and enforcement mechanisms** available to the IAEA, whose access, budget, personnel resources and technological resources fall far short of what would be needed to detect every NPT violation. In 2014, the IAEA’s overall budget was approximately $345 million, but an advisory panel determined that the IAEA’s budget would need to double by 2020 in order to meet future demands on its capabilities. Even discounting nuclear facilities that the IAEA does not have access to, such as those in North Korea, nuclear materials have reached the black market from facilities under IAEA safeguards, namely, from several in Pakistan. One positive step has been the widespread adoption of the IAEA Additional Protocol, which strengthens the agency’s inspections mandate and is in force in 124 countries, including all five recognized nuclear weapon states and, as of 2014, India. Nonetheless, more than half of all NPT member states—including Syria and Iran (which has ratified but not implemented the protocol)—have yet to agree to the additional safeguards and inspections capabilities allowed under the Additional Protocol. And despite U.S. efforts, the 2010 NPT Review Conference failed to achieve consensus to make the Additional Protocol mandatory for all member states.

Other multilateral, informal organizations also play a role in implementing and enforcing the NPT, notably the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Made up of forty-six states with advanced nuclear power programs, the NSG prohibits the transfer of civilian nuclear materials or technology to states outside the NPT, or those that do not fully comply with IAEA safeguards. However, the **NSG’s export bans are not legally binding**, and members (including the United States, Russia, and China) have pursued civilian nuclear projects with non-NPT members. In addition, many developing countries have criticized [PDF] the NSG as a club of developed economies that limits developing countries’ access to nuclear materials and technologies. Finally, the NSG’s effectiveness as an export control regime may decline as nuclear trade increasingly involves [PDF] states outside of the NSG.

## Impact

### ! – Nuclear Proliferation

#### **It’s likely - encourages nuclear preemptive strikes and breaks down alliances**

Sokolski 18 (Henry D. Sokolski - executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center and served as a member of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Senior Advisory Grou on two Congressional nuclear proliferation commissions, “Underestimated: Our Not So Peaceful Nuclear Future”, Strategic Studies Institute, August 2018, <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1070596.pdf>, MG)

Moreover, what the two skeptical academic camps agree on—that the dangers associated with nuclear weapons proliferation are exaggerated—is **rebuttable**. First, they gloss over the serious military risks faced by nations acquiring nuclear weapons. One can see this most clearly by their inattention to the numerous historical cases of **preventive military actions** taken against states attempting to build their first bomb and to serious plans countries have made to knock out the nuclear capabilities of new nuclear weapons states.

In the first category are: the British campaign against the Nazi-operated heavy water plant in Norway; Iran’s air strike against Iraq’s Osirak reactor in 1980; Israel’s attack of the same reactor in 1981; Iraq’s repeated strikes against Bushehr between 1984 and 1988; America’s air strike against Iraq’s nuclear facilities and Saddam’s failed Scud missile strike against Israel’s Dimona reactor in 1991; an American Tomahawk missile strike against Iraq’s uranium enrichment plant at Zaafaraniyah; British and American strikes against a variety of suspect Iraqi nuclear sites in 1998; Israel’s air strike against Syria’s covert nuclear reactor in 2007; and U.S. and Israeli covert and cyber attacks against Iran’s nuclear program from 2006 to 2010.

Just as numerous are the occasions that states planned or prepared to knock out the nuclear weapons capabilities of their adversaries. The U.S. military gave serious thought to using **nuclear weapons** to destroy the Soviet Union’s nuclear complex in 1949 and China’s in 1964. It also made preliminary military preparations for attacking North Korea’s nuclear complex in 1994. The Russians, meanwhile, considered attacking South African nuclear facilities in 1976 after detecting South African preparations to test. They even asked the United States for assistance in making the strike. In 1969, a major border dispute between China and Russia went hot and Moscow seriously considered attacking China’s nuclear complex. Two years before, Egypt threatened Israel’s production reactor at Dimona. Israel and India, meanwhile, cooperated in several schemes in the 1980s (one of which nearly was implemented) to knock out Pakistan’s nuclear weapons facilities at Kahuta.50

Second, while most academic skeptics believe nuclear weapons automatically deter aggression near perfectly even in small numbers, others believe nuclear weapons are militarily useless even if these weapons are numerous and advanced. Because of this, academic skeptics pay little attention to the security risks that may come with deep nuclear weapons reductions—i.e., the transitions from nuclear plenty to zero—risks, which are potentially serious.

Finally, academic skeptics tend to ignore or gloss over the risks “**upward” nuclear transitions present**. These dangers are three-fold. First, as the number of nuclear weapons players increases, the **gravity, complexity, and likelihood of ruinous nuclear incidents may increase within states** (e.g., unauthorized or accidental use, terrorist theft, irredentist seizure, etc.) and between them (e.g., **catalytic wars, misread nuclear signaling**, etc.). Second, and closely related, are the numerous technical and managerial challenges each nuclear state faces to make their nuclear forces robust and survivable enough to have any hope of effectively deterring attacks. These challenges are most severe for new nuclear weapons forces but are hardly inconsequential for large, mature forces.51 Last, as the number of states possessing nuclear forces increases to include nations covered by nuclear security alliance guarantees, the continued **viability and coherence of these alliance systems are likely to be tested in the extreme**, increasing the prospects for war.52

#### Allied prolif triggers collapses the arms control architecture

Chunsi 6/16 (Wu Chunsi – Senior Fellow and Director at the Institute for International Strategic Studies at SIIS, “Russia-Ukraine Conflict: Ramifications for Arms Control and Nuclear Disarmament”, ChinaUSFocus, 16 June 2022, <https://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/russia-ukraine-conflict-ramifications-for-arms-control-and-nuclear-disarmament>, MG)

Third, **the growing risk** of more countries choosing to cross the nuclear threshold. Ukrainians have now come to regret their decision to give up the nuclear weapons on their soil—then the world’s third-largest arsenal—in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union. The pervasive sense of betrayal in Ukraine is prompting a **defense policy rethink in many non-nuclear weapon states**. Of special note is the fact that the latest list of nuclear aspirants now includes America’s leading **allies in East Asia, Japan and South Korea**, which are seriously contemplating the deployment of nuclear weapons on their soil.[2] It reminds the world that the risk of nuclear proliferation is not confined to Washington’s sworn enemies like Iran and North Korea. In retrospect, during the Cold War the United States either acquiesced to allies’ nuclear ambitions or simply rolled over when a country it wanted to court crossed the nuclear threshold. Nuclear proliferation among **U.S. allies and partners** will send a shock wave through the global arms control architecture.

#### **Empirics prove nuclear proliferation increases risk of nuclear war**

Quek 16 (Kai Quek PhD – Associate Professor of Politics at the University of Hong Kong, “Nuclear Proliferation and the Use of Nuclear Options: Experimental Tests”, Political Research Quarterly, June 2016, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/44018003.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Aaaf6a9f34fa51d7e3f0281314c688765&ab_segments=&origin=>, MG)

Does nuclear proliferation affect the risk that nuclear weapons will be used in a crisis? The question implicates human survival but is difficult to study, as observations of nuclear war do not actually exist. Our empirical knowl- edge is thus limited. I use experimental games with nuclear options to circumvent the observational con- straint and construct empirical tests. I find that decisions **are mostly peaceful at N = 2** despite the existence of nuclear options with a relative first-strike advantage. This finding is especially relevant as most nuclear-state con- frontations in history had been bilateral crises. More gen- erally, I find that one is less likely to choose the nuclear option when it is known that the number of nuclear actors in the crisis is small, and more likely to choose the nuclear option when it is known that the number of nuclear actors is large. In particular, a jump in the number of nuclear actors in crisis **beyond N = 2** significantly **increases** the chance of choosing the **nuclear option**. Preliminary probes also suggest that players in inter-alliance crises are more peaceful when they have second-strike counter- value capabilities, and that nuclear framing has no sig- nificant effect on the use of the nuclear option

### ! – Nuke Prolif – AT: Feasibility

#### **It’s completely feasible by literally everyone – coming from the person presidentially appointed to deal with nuclear threats**

Rosenthal and Stern 19 (Michael D. Rosenthal PhD - served in the United States Department of State and the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) as a member of the Senior Executive Service as well as in the Department of Safeguards at the International Atomic Energy Agency and also held positions at Brookhaven National Laboratory and the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, Warren Stern - internationally recognized leader and manager in the area of nuclear safeguards, safety and security. He is currently a senior advisor in Brookhaven Lab's Nonproliferation and National Security Department (NNSD). Stern has held leadership positions at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Department of State, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). President Barack Obama appointed him to lead DHS's Domestic Nuclear Detection Office as well, “Deterring Nuclear Proliferation: The Importance of IAEA Safeguards”, Brookhaven National Laboratory, April 2019, <https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1525379>, MG)

Dealing with the second problem with reactor-grade plutonium, the heat generated by Pu-238 and Pu-240, requires careful management of the heat in the device. There are well developed means for addressing these problems and they are **not considered a significant hurdle** to the production of nuclear weapons, even for **developing states or sub-national groups**. The radiation from Americium-241 means that more shielding and greater precautions to protect personnel might be necessary when building and handling nuclear explosives made from reactor-grade plutonium. But these difficulties are **not prohibitive**. While reactor-grade plutonium has a slightly larger critical mass than weapon-grade plutonium (meaning that somewhat more material would be needed for a bomb), this would not be a major impediment for design of either crude or sophisticated nuclear weapons.

The degree to which these obstacles can be overcome depends on the sophistication of the state or group attempting to produce a nuclear weapon. At the lowest level of sophistication, a potential proliferating state or subnational group using designs and technologies no more sophisticated than those used in first-generation nuclear weapons **could build a nuclear weapon** from reactorgrade plutonium that would have an assured, reliable yield of one or a few kilotons (and a probable yield significantly higher than that). At the other end of the spectrum, advanced nuclear weapon states such as the United States and Russia, using modern designs, could produce weapons from reactor-grade plutonium having reliable explosive yields, weight, and other characteristics generally comparable to those of weapons made from weapon-grade plutonium. The greater radioactivity would mean increased radiation doses to workers fabricating such weapons, and military personnel spending long periods of time in close proximity to them, and the greater heat and radiation generated from reactor-grade plutonium might result in a need to replace certain weapon components more frequently. Proliferating states using designs of intermediate sophistication could produce weapons with assured yields **substantially higher** than the kilotonrange possible with a simple, first-generation nuclear device. \*

Every state which has built nuclear weapons from plutonium to date has chosen to produce weapons-grade plutonium for that purpose. States have been willing to make large investments in some cases to acquire weapon-grade rather than reactor-grade plutonium: the United States, for example, in the 1980s, considered spending billions of dollars on the Special Isotope Separation facility to enrich reactor-grade plutonium to weapon-grade. The disadvantage of reactor-grade plutonium is **not so much in the effectiveness of the nuclear weapons** that can be made from it as in the **increased complexity** in designing, fabricating, and handling them. The possibility that either a state or a sub-national group would choose to use reactor-grade plutonium, should sufficient stocks of weapon-grade plutonium not be readily available, **cannot be discounted.**

In short, reactor-grade plutonium is weapons-usable, whether by **unsophisticated proliferators or by advanced nuclear weapon states**. Theft of separated plutonium, whether weapon-grade or reactor-grade, would pose a grave security risk.”

#### **Declassified government documents say it became feasible 30 YEARS AGO**

O’Shei 91 (Donald M. O’Shei – U.S. Army General that represented the US in SALT talks with Russia, “IMPLICATIONS OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION”, Department of State, Revised 1991 [Eighteenth Session of the Senior Seminar in Foreign Policy for the Department of State Originally], <https://nautilus.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/769-Donald-M.-OShei.pdf>, MG)

There is a school of thought that any concentration of Pu-240 or Pu-242 in a fuel of over 1-2% renders the fuel unsuitable for weapons manufacture. Since the enriched uranium reactor produces such a waste, and since isotopes of plutonium cannot be separated chemically, this is equivalent to saying that only the plutonium produced by a natural uranium reactor is of weapons quality. This view is **subject to question**. It is conceded that a great power interested in only very high quality and control standards in weapons would avoid such fuel. This would **not necessarily follow for a nuclear aspirant**. If high Pu-240 content, say up to 8-10%, plutonium were the only available material, a country might accept the unreliability and fabrication complexities associated with such fuels **in preference to having no weapons at all.** While there is no evidence that this has ever been done, it should not be ruled out as a possibility.

Recapitulation

Virtually **any nation** can come up with a delivery system for a nuclear weapon. The construction of the device is considerably more difficult but, with the possible exception of an implosion mechanism suitable for high Pu-240 plutonium fuels, a long list of countries could manage a low yield solution if they were to decide to give priority to the task and if they will accept fairly low standards. It may be sometime before technology will permit refinement of weapons grade U-235 fuels for all but the very rich industrial nations. In the interim, however, enough plutonium can be processed by chemical methods from reactor waste to permit **any country with even a very modest reactor program** to charge a few bombs a year. The short answer to the question "**Can they build the bomb**?" would appear, except for very undeveloped fourth world countries, to be **yes**.

### ! – Prolif O/W Climate

#### **Tests prove nuclear proliferation outweighs and turns climate change**

Toon et al. 21 (Owen B. Toon PhD - Professor in the Department of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences at the University of Colorado, Alan Robock PhD - American climatologist and currently a Distinguished Professor in the Department of Environmental Sciences at Rutgers University , Richard P. Turco - American atmospheric scientist, and Professor at the Institute of the Environment, Department of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences, University of California, “Modelling Armageddon: The effects of nuclear weapons on climate”, Open Access Government, 11 May 2021, <https://www.openaccessgovernment.org/modelling-armageddon-the-effects-of-nuclear-weapons-on-climate/109988/>, MG)

Obviously, all of these factors could never be determined precisely beforehand. Even so, enough **work has been done** – exhaustively in many areas – to define the boundaries of the problem. For example, the damages inflicted by a nuclear blast and prompt radiation are relatively well understood from more than 500 above-ground weapons tests conducted from the 1940s through the 1960s. Also known are the incendiary effects of nuclear bursts, but these are less well known partly because testing was not as focused on this aspect of nuclear weapons. Understanding the climate changes that might result from smoke produced by nuclear fires requires knowledge of the types and amounts of fuel consumed, the quantities and forms of black carbon (the highly absorbing component of smoke) generated, and the fraction of that black carbon deposited in the upper atmosphere, where it could reside for years.

As each of these questions is slowly being resolved, the overall uncertainty in the outcome of nuclear war is steadily being reduced. New evidence, for example, from large forest fires in Canada (2017) and Australia (2020) reveals that **smoke** from intense fires **is readily lofted** into the stratosphere. There, without rain to remove it, smoke can be tracked by satellites over many months, and its distribution analysed using the same models employed to predict global changes following a nuclear war, including nuclear winter. The behaviour of the wildfire smoke mimics that predicted for massive smoke injections expected from nuclear-ignited firestorms, including alterations in wind patterns and air temperatures3. Moreover, newer simulations of historical volcanic eruptions also indicate similar effects – such as the “year without a summer” that followed the Tambora eruption of 1815 – and which was noted by Ronald Reagan as a reason to fear a nuclear winter.

Recently, we employed these same models to simulate the possible outcome of a regional-scale nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan, perhaps triggered by their continuing disputes over Kashmir. Remarkably, even such a **limited use of nuclear weapons** could lead to the **coldest global temperatures** **recorded in the last 1,000 years4**, resulting in a reduction in worldwide crop yields by tens of percent5.

It is generally agreed that the only legitimate reason for maintaining substantial arsenals of nuclear weapons is to avoid war. Nevertheless, the existence of such weapons and the robust means to use them, implies that **global nuclear conflict cannot be dismissed as impossible or even improbable**. And **unlike global warming**, which has been decades and centuries in the making, nuclear warfare could play out in **mere hours or days**. But the consequences would last years, shatter civilization, and create climatic anomalies comparable to a sudden ice age, leading to deprivation on a global scale6, possibly affecting billions of individuals. Leadership must do everything in its power to ensure that nuclear weapons can never be used, including actionable treaties on arms reductions, national policies to increase weapon security, and international diplomacy to **stop and reverse nuclear proliferation**.

### T/C – NATO

#### **The US clarifying their retaliation posture encourages warfare, alienates allies, and destroys NATO unity – turns case**

Robertson 21 (George Robertson - a former UK defence secretary and was the 10th secretary-general of Nato, “US nuclear arms shift could raise risk of inadvertent conflict”, Financial Times, 14 November 2021, <https://www.ft.com/content/1e0f2194-dbc2-4c37-84a2-75308daa1710>, MG)  
Biden has already hinted that he is considering a “sole purpose” policy, a pledge that the US would use nuclear weapons only in a narrowly prescribed set of circumstances. “I believe that the sole purpose of the US nuclear arsenal should be deterring — and, if necessary, retaliating against — a nuclear attack,” he wrote in March 2020. “As president, I will work to put that belief into practice.” A number of other influential voices are now encouraging a move in this direction, or even a shift to a policy of “no first use” of nuclear weapons. For the sake of **Nato unity**, these ideas must be resisted.

“No first use” sounds appealing, and its advocates argue that the US can set an example to other nuclear powers that would, in time, reduce the threat of nuclear conflict. They are wrong. There are three reasons why both this and “sole purpose” would undermine deterrence, **divide Nato** and increase the risk of conflict.

First, a US declaration would be treated with scepticism by potential adversaries — because authoritarian regimes are likely to judge others by their own standards — and could even encourage them **towards military aggression** if the threat of nuclear reprisals is lifted. Paradoxically, changing the present definition of nuclear deterrence would increase the risk of a **major conventional conflict** that could return us to the era of mass civilian casualties last seen in the 20th century.  
Second, Nato as a nuclear alliance is **deliberately ambiguous** about the circumstances in which it might authorise the deployment of nuclear weapons to deter attacks on the territory or interests of its members. In the aftermath of the cold war, when there was no credible conventional threat to Nato’s European allies, the alliance reduced its emphasis on nuclear deterrence. But Russia’s invasions of Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014, and the massive boost to Moscow’s conventional and nuclear capabilities in the past few years, have necessarily raised the profile of nuclear weapons in Nato’s defence posture.

While nuclear ambiguity may be uncomfortable, it is **necessary** in order to reduce the temptation for adversaries to “game” our deterrence strategy by taking actions that will fall just short of provoking a military response.

Third, at a time of heightened tension due to Russia and China’s growing military power and threatening behaviour, a US declaration of “sole purpose” or “no first use” would **unsettle Washington’s allies** in Europe and the Asia-Pacific. By casting doubt on its security guarantees, the US would run the risk of making its allies and friends **more susceptible to coercion**, or of driving them to develop nuclear weapons of their own as a form of insurance. And that would potentially kickstart further nuclear proliferation and add to the risk of pre-emptive actions by Russia and China.

Advocates of change are right to say that progress on nuclear disarmament is painfully slow. But it will be achieved only by skilful diplomatic management of the conflicting ambitions and interests of the major powers. Painstaking efforts are needed to revive bilateral and, in time, multilateral steps towards verifiable nuclear disarmament and the prevention of proliferation. Eye-catching gestures from the US such as declarations of “sole purpose” or ‘no first use’ would **undermine the Nato alliance** and lead only to greater instability and insecurity.

### AO – Turkish Arms Race

#### **Concerns over nuclear credibility push Turkey to pursue nukes**

Fitzpatrick 11 (Mark Fitzpatrick - director of the nonproliferation and disarmament program at the International Institute for Strategic Studies and former US diplomat serving inter alia as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for NonProliferation, “How Europeans view tactical nuclear weapons on their continent”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 2011, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0096340211399405>, MG)

In Turkey’s case, the US nuclear weapons stationed at Incirlik Air Force base are seen as playing an important security role, providing reassurance of American assistance in the event of an emergency and a “hook” tethering Turkey to the European mainland. The nuclear weapons also appear to perform a **nonproliferation function**: As long as Turkey has access to US nuclear weapons it can turn to in extremis, there is **no need** for Ankara to consider developing its **own nuclear weapons** option. Given that the whole of Turkey falls within range of Iranian nuclear-capable ballistic missiles, the nuclear weapons may be **more relevant now** than they were in the past two decades. Turkish officials say they do not feel directly threatened by Iran, but they do feel a strong need to maintain power parity with the other non-Arab Muslim regional power. If Iran acquires nuclear weapons, Turkey’s relative power in the region will weaken and its sense of security will diminish if the US arsenal is withdrawn precipitously. If US nuclear weapons were to be withdrawn from **other NATO countries**, Turkey would have reason to feel exposed and to question the fundamental principles of alliance solidarity and burdensharing that have been the basis of Turkey’s nuclear hosting arrangements (Kibaroglu, 2010).

For Ankara, the deterrent role of the US nuclear weapons in Turkey has shifted focus from the Soviet Union to Turkey’s regional neighbors Iraq, Syria, and Iran-all of which have at some point acquired unconventional weapons systems and ballistic missiles (Kibaroglu, 2010). Given Turkey’s recent and ongoing rapprochement with these countries, however, the deterrence rationale for the nuclear stationing has eroded. Efforts to bring about a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East may also undermine the **viability of the deployments**. In addition, many Turks have a lingering skepticism about NATO security guarantees, which they did not feel were forthcoming in the first and second Gulf Wars.

#### **Turkey pursuing nuclear weapons triggers Middle East nuclear arms races and destroys Euro-Atlantic alliance cohesion**

Apostolou-Katsaros 21 (Konstantinos Apostolou-Katsaros PhD – Lecturer and Research Associate at the University of Brighton, “Turkey’s Nuclear Dreams are a Nightmare for the International Community”, Greek City Times, 13 September 2021, <https://greekcitytimes.com/2021/09/13/turkeys-nuclear-dreams-are-a-nightmare-for-the-international-community/>, MG)

Russia has every reason to provide the know-how for the construction of Turkey’s Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant in an attempt to hinder NATO’s unity. However, the Russian-Turkish [opportunistic](https://slpress.gr/diethni/i-rosotoyrkiki-proseggisi-echei-kai-atheati-opsi-i-antifasi-tis-dysis/) cooperation will not feed the latter’s ambition in attaining nuclear weapons. Their competing interests [collide](https://www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2021RP05/) in many cases. Russia wouldn’t want to see a nuclear arsenal in such close proximity to its borders. The leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia Vladimir Zhirinovsky is [convinced](https://www.easternherald.com/2021/01/19/erdogans-appearance-of-nuclear-weapons-be-a-threat-to-russia/): if Iran and especially Turkey have nuclear weapons, they will turn against Russia. This does not suggest that Turkey will not achieve its aim. On the contrary it means that Turkey will have to overcome many obstacles set by important states with interests in the wider region, such as [Israel](https://www.jpost.com/opinion/turkey-is-increasingly-becoming-a-threat-to-israel-635054), [France](https://www.iris-france.org/140221-a-look-upon-turkeys-future-nuclear-weapons-policy/), [Egypt](https://ahvalnews.com/nuclear-bomb/iran-nuclear-bomb-paves-way-saudi-turkey-follow-suit-says-biden), [Saudi Arabia](https://ahvalnews.com/nuclear-bomb/iran-nuclear-bomb-paves-way-saudi-turkey-follow-suit-says-biden) and the [UAE](https://euideas.eui.eu/2019/11/12/the-imminent-risk-of-nuclear-proliferation-in-the-middle-east/). Above all, Turkey will have to face the growing **conflict of interest with the US.** There are many reasons upon which Turkey will not be tolerated as nuclear-weapon state. As abovementioned, this will **instigate its geostrategic autonomy**, causing the **existing Euro-Atlantic security architecture to disintegrate**. In addition, it will trigger a **nuclear arms race** in the wider region. All of these destabilization fears have long been [addressed](https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CPRT-110SPRT39674/html/CPRT-110SPRT39674.htm) by the US.

Consequently Turkey’s alleged choice to approach the co-religionist (and less pro-Western under the leadership of Imran Khan) and willing Pakistanis for supporting its nuclear-weapons program ([1](https://twitter.com/BabakTaghvaee/status/1198308784290045959) , [2](https://greekcitytimes.com/2021/04/07/pakistan-helping-turkey-nuclear/) , [3](https://slpress.gr/diethni/o-axonas-toyrkia-pakistan-aggizei-to-aigaio-i-pyriniki-diastasi-kai-i-tromokratia/) and [4](https://slpress.gr/ethnika/to-flert-toy-erntogan-me-ta-pyrinika-apo-to-pakistan-sto-aigaio/)), does not come as a surprise, since it has little or no other option in this venture. The two Sunni forces share the same strategic goals in the Mediterranean and India which derive from their close [historic](https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2020/04/dmap-turkey-and-pakistan-a-special-relationship) and [economic](https://fainst.eu/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/FAINST-ReportNo2-Turkey_Potential_Nuclear_Power.pdf) ties. Their defense cooperation agreements ([1](https://eurasiantimes.com/breaking-pakistani-air-force-pilots-flying-turkish-f-16-jets-as-erdogan-attempts-to-fill-the-coup-void-reports/) , [2](https://www.theweek.in/news/world/2021/08/22/turkey-expands-cooperation-with-pakistan-on-long-endurance-drone.html) , [3](https://www.kathimerini.com.cy/gr/kosmos/istoriki-amyntiki-symfonia-toyrkias-%E2%80%93-pakistan) , [4](https://zeenews.india.com/world/turkey-pakistan-in-top-level-discussion-over-nuclear-weapon-program-2333996.html) , [5](https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2020/02/erdogan-turkey-discuss-trade-military-pakistan-china.html) , [6](https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2020/04/dmap-turkey-and-pakistan-a-special-relationship) and [7](https://www.trt.net.tr/greek/tourkia/2017/05/11/amuntikes-sumphonias-upographekan-metaxu-tes-tourkias-kai-tou-pakistan-730225)) are already expanding as a result of the events in Afghanistan which contributed to further strengthen their relations ([1](https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/afghanistans-winners-qatar-russia-china-pakistan-turkey-iran-676844) , [2](https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/diplomacy/turkey-pakistan-agree-on-close-coordination-in-afghanistan) and [3](https://www.amynanet.gr/to-stoichima-tis-epomenis-imeras-sto-afganistan-realpolitik-taliban-prosfygiko-kina-spanies-gaies-kai-al-qaeda)). The director of the [Middle East Center for Reporting and Analysis](https://www.mideastcenter.org/), Jonathan Speyer, [stresses](https://www.jpost.com/opinion/behind-the-lines-mr-erdogan-has-settled-your-bill-609346) that “Ankara’s strong and burgeoning strategic ties to Pakistan are causing international concern regarding the possibility of a transfer of **nuclear weapons knowledge** between the two countries. Turkey already has the will and the raw materials. This knowledge is the factor it currently lacks.”

**Drifting apart from the West**

Nonetheless, Turkey’s eagerness to embark on a nuclear-weapons program should be seen in the bigger context. There are clear indications that the Eurasianist ideology creeps in Turkey’s top-ranking policymakers. Analysts identify this ideology as a Turkish version of the [Ba’athism](https://www.mei.edu/publications/rise-eurasianism-turkish-foreign-policy-can-turkey-change-its-pro-western-orientation) in the Arab world. The Eurasianists argue that Turkey’s interests lie outside the Western world and therefore should join the “anti-imperialist” camp led by Russia and China.

When speaking about Afghanistan, Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan  [said](https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/president-erdogan-reiterates-2-state-solution-to-cyprus-issue-166445): “Imperial powers entered Afghanistan; they have been there for over 20 years. We also stood by our Afghan brothers against all imperial powers.” A similar [statement](https://www.independent.co.uk/asia/south-asia/taliban-pakistan-imran-khan-afghanistan-b1903821.html) made by the Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan, revealed the common grounds of the two Sunni forces in their ideological (and religious) beliefs. He said that the Taliban are “breaking the chains of slavery.” Some would argue that both statesmen are influenced by the jihad theorist Sayyid Qutb (author of the influential book “Milestones”) and his idea of victimization of Muslims by foreigners or “imperialists”. He believed that western nations are attempting to undermine Islamic empowerment thus jihad is the tool to liberate the “suppressed” Muslims from the “imperial powers” (see also [1](http://anadoluturkhaber.net/TR/Detail/Erdogan-Designates-Acquaintance-As-Terrorist/892) , [2](https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/erdogans-embrace-of-afghanistan-sociopath-gulbuddin-hekmatyar-provides-a-window-into-his-soul) , [3](https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/calls-for-jihad-in-kashmir-against-kashmiris-cause-pak-interest-imran-khan/article29811581.ece)).

**Conclusions**

It is evident that the alleged new venture of Turkey in the nuclear weapons field is in all cases a cause of serious concern for its Western allies. Its decision to drift away ([1](https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/reports/2021/01/19/494738/flashpoints-u-s-turkey-relations-2021/) and [2](https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/17721/erdogan-afghanistan-terrorists)) from the **North Atlantic alliance** and become a strategically autonomous Eurasianist power, presupposes the acquisition of a nuclear arsenal. This will lead to a **reflexive nuclear arms race** of key states in the wider sensitive region, hindering the already fragile balances and **undermining the existing Euro-Atlantic security architecture**. Such prospect cannot be reversed by false hopes on a softer policy after a leadership change in the Turkish elections of 2023, or worst by transactionalism that will boost Turkey’s confidence. It is arguable that Turkey’s overambitious geopolitical balancing act is pushing the limits of its diplomatic, economic and military capabilities. Therefore restraining its activities in these fields (especially its military hardware / technology as well as the space, missile and nuclear programs) by the states affected most and the US, is most likely to weaken its eagerness and tame its revisionist goals.

#### **That causes a nuclear daisy chain – escalation and miscalc are likely**

Kahl et al. 13 (Colin H. Kahl - Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security and an associate professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Melissa G. Dalton - Visiting Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, Matthew Irvine - Research Associate at the Center for a New American Security, “Atomic Kingdom: If Iran Builds the Bomb, Will Saudi Arabia Be Next?”, Center for a New American Security, February 2013, <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/161866/CNAS_AtomicKingdom_Kahl.pdf>, MG)

The bad news is that low probability is not the same as no probability, and all of the possible Saudi responses entail significant risks and costs. In the near term, it is technically impossible for Saudi Arabia to indigenously develop nuclear weapons; the risk of Pakistan transferring nuclear weapons to the Kingdom is also overstated. Nevertheless, the risk of the latter scenario is **not zero**. Moreover, even if Riyadh fails to acquire its own nuclear weapons shortly after Iran does, a Saudi hedging strategy could still produce such a capability over the long run. Either the low-probability Pakistani option or the higher-probability hedging path could lead to the emergence of a **poly-nuclear Middle East**, with profound consequences for the region. The basic principles of nuclear deterrence that held during the Cold War, and that continue to hold in South and East Asia today, would likely hold if there were multiple nuclear powers in the Middle East. However, tensions and crises would probably increase. And even if all the relevant actors were assumed to be rational, various factors – the absence of secure second-strike capabilities (at least for some period of time), **unreliable early warning** and command-and-control systems, close geographic proximity and deep mutual distrust – could still inadvertently produce a **regional nuclear war** via **miscalculations**, accidents or unauthorized use.183

It is also good news that the Saudis are less likely to be attracted to a Pakistani extended deterrence guarantee (and Islamabad is less likely to offer one) than is commonly assumed. But should this moderate-probability scenario emerge, it would extend the South Asian geopolitical competition directly into the Middle East, thereby connecting two of the world’s most crisis- and conflict-prone regions into a **nuclear daisy chain**.

## Aff

### Link Turn

#### **No link or we turn – policy makers think nuclear deterrence is eternal and AND think emerging tech makes nuclear deterrence better**

Onderco and Zutt 21 (Michal Onderco PhD - Max Weber Fellow at the European University Institute, Madeline Zutt - research associate at Erasmus University Rotterdam, “Emerging technology and nuclear security: What does the wisdom of the crowd tell us?”, Contemporary Security Policy, 23 May 2021, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13523260.2021.1928963>, MG)

We have studied the views that experts and decision-makers have when it comes to the impact of emerging technologies on nuclear deterrence and disarmament. Beyond the substantial findings, discussed below, our article also demonstrates that expert surveys might be a suitable measure to map the views of epistemic community when faced with future, unpredictable developments. Regardless of a particular approach one uses, using multiple expert insights is a promising way to deal with uncertainty about the future. This is not related only to the field of security policy or international relations. As DeWees and Minson (2018) note, “the combination of multiple, independent judgments is often more accurate than even an expert’s individual judgment.” While there are possible risks (as DeWees andMinson make clear, once experts make up their mind, it is difficult to persuade them otherwise), faced with uncertainty the wisdom of the crowd offers an attractive option.

Our respondents noted that the destabilizing impacts of emerging technologies in the nuclear realm come from the fact that these technologies compound the risks of close calls, mishaps and misunderstandings. They were concerned about the potentials for future close calls and misinterpretation and therefore thought that as emerging technologies become more ubiquitous, they also make **nuclear deterrence more unstable**.

Some of the decision-makers felt that some of the threats commonly associated with emerging technologies in the scholarly discourse are overblown. There was, for example, skepticism about whether nuclear launch decisions will ever be delegated to an entity other than humans, or whether HGVs are anything other than fancy missiles. Our interviewees were concerned about cyber risks, but they also felt that the use of cyber technologies for strategic purposes is most likely not going to happen. These findings underline that in spite of the growing attention given to emerging technologies among thinktankers and academics alike, **decision-makers are less concerned** about these technologies. This means that either the experts are alarmist, or that they need to build better epistemic communities to convey to decisionmakers the risks that these technologies pose. Furthermore, the centrality attached to nuclear weapons in strategic thinking and planning appears to undermine any idea of weakening. Our survey and interviews showed that while the respondents could imagine that emerging technologies will have a more prominent role in deterrence by denial; **nuclear weapons will remain dominant in deterrence by punishment**. This is rather curious since recent work in thinking about long-range conventional strikes highlights that these technologies might change the calculus and appear to affect deterrence by punishment (Montgomery, 2020). However, when it comes to technologies like HGVs or cyberwarfare, the scholars are much more skeptical.

When referring to the positive applications of emerging technologies, many of those surveyed reported that technologies can be used to **enhance nuclear safeguarding** and verification measures. In this respect, decisionmakers felt **that if there is one contribution that emerging technologies can make** to nuclear disarmament, it would be here. Curiously, our experts were quite skeptical about the prospects for global nuclear disarmament. The majority of the experts did not think that nuclear disarmament was going to happen in the next 50 years, and a large portion of the experts did not think that nuclear disarmament would make us safer. This seems to support the realist view that nuclear proliferation is a result of the security dilemma, and the removal of nuclear weapons would not resolve the underlying calculus but might make conflict more likely (Waltz, 1981). This is doubly curious, since the majority of our experts came from European countries, where civil society pressure for nuclear disarmament is growing. Therefore, we observe that both the general public and civil society are out of step with the experts. The perception that nuclear disarmament is unachievable (in a reasonable timeframe) and that it would not make the world safer might explain why nuclear disarmament is not a policy priority for numerous experts. As Pelopidas (2020) recently remarked, if elites believe that **nuclear weapons are eternal**, then the motivation for doing something about disarmament is not as much of a priority for them.

### I/L Turn

#### **Relying on nuclear doesn’t reassure allies but encourages nuke prolif – enhanced conventional deterrence solves**

Blechman and Rumbaugh 15 (Barry Blechman PhD - co-founder and a Distinguished Fellow of the Stimson Center, Russell Rumbaugh - American defense policy advisor and retired military officer who was the nominee to serve as assistant secretary of the Navy, “Protecting US Security by Minimizing the Role of Nuclear Weapons: A NEW US NUCLEAR POLICY”, Stimson, May 2015, <https://www.stimson.org/wp-content/files/file-attachments/ProjectAtom_051315%20(1).pdf>, MG)

Maintaining allies’ confidence in US commitments requires frequent consultations, political reassurances, high-level meetings, and cooperation in military planning. US **conventional forces** also provide a global, visible, flexible, and credible means of reassuring allies — particularly when they are deployed on the ally’s territory or conduct temporary deployments to exercise jointly with allied forces. Though nuclear guarantees are an important component of US security commitments, allies doubt them more than they doubt US conventional commitments because of the greater risk they pose to the US homeland. If an adversary in fact attacked a US ally with conventional forces, the adversary would have already discounted the US commitment to defend the ally. And if US credibility had already been discounted, the potentially graver consequences of a nuclear response would make nuclear guarantees even less credible in the eyes of the adversary. Consequently, the US should make clear repeatedly that it will fulfill all of its treaty obligations and would respond **conventionally to conventional** attacks against allies, and with nuclear weapons in the event of nuclear attacks. The long history of US security commitments, and the sacrifices in blood and money which the American people have repeatedly made in defense of these commitments, provide ample evidence that US security guarantees are credible.

Although the US should pursue all feasible conventional and diplomatic means to assure allies, there is **no level** of force deployment, whether conventional or nuclear, that can guarantee allies’ confidence in American security commitments. Some allies have expressed concerns about American security commitments despite the presence of tens-of-thousands of permanently based US forces, underscoring the dependence of allied confidence on factors beyond military presence. Joint command and control of tactical nuclear weapons under NATO nuclear sharing arrangements has apparently **failed to reassure** some NATO members, which demonstrates that the forward deployment of nuclear weapons may also be **insufficient** to assure allies. Furthermore, though it is undiplomatic to acknowledge, allies often express grave concerns about potential threats and worry about US security commitments, but then fail to take steps to significantly increase their own defense capabilities, raising questions about the seriousness of their concerns. And the frank truth is that the alternatives to dependence on US security guarantees are even less palatable for most US allies. Allying with Russia or China is not a reasonable alternative to a US alliance, attempting to balance Russian or Chinese military capabilities unilaterally or in combination with neighboring states would be a difficult and unnecessary choice, and developing nuclear weapons of their own is in most cases **too far** a stretch financially or politically.

By making clear that the US believes nuclear weapons can serve only to deter nuclear attacks, the US also would be helping to weaken perceptions of the importance of these weapons and to strengthen perceptions of the dangers they pose, thereby facilitating efforts to limit or reverse pro- liferation and reduce nuclear arsenals. In contrast, if the United States were to make clear it relies on nuclear weapons for a larger set of roles, it would **legitimize these weapons**, falsely draw attention to their potential uses, and thereby **encourage nuclear proliferation**. US threats to respond to conventional attack with nuclear weapons exaggerate the utility of nuclear weapons and could reinforce other states’ inclination to acquire nuclear arsenals. If the US were to threaten a nuclear attack despite its conventional superiority, states with weaker conventional forces might have even more incentive to follow suit. The repetition of explicit threats to initiate the first use of nuclear weapons in a conflict could render such threats more credible and gradually weaken the taboo against the use of nuclear weapons.

In all of these potential use of military force scenarios, save nuclear deterrence, nuclear weapons do not provide any capabilities or attributes US conventional superiority does not also provide. In short, nuclear weapons **do not advance US interests**, diplomacy, or nuclear policy, and its nuclear posture should therefore minimize them.

### No I/L

#### **Nuclear is dead – everyone moved on**

Chalmers and Lunn 10 (Malcolm Chalmers - Professorial Fellow in British Security Policy at the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, Simon Lunn - Associate Fellow of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, “NATO’s Tactical Nuclear Dilemma”, RUSI, March 2010, <https://static.rusi.org/201003_op_natos_tactical_nuclear_dilemma.pdf>, MG)

Since the Cold War ended, however, the role of these weapons in NATO strategy has been dramatically reduced, as have their numbers. Unofficial estimates suggest that only around 150-250 US warheads remain in Europe, all free-fall gravity bombs designed for use with US and allied tactical aircraft. This reduction has largely taken place away from the public spotlight, with little interest beyond the specialist defence and arms control communities.

Yet the prospect that this protracted drawdown might soon lead to their final elimination has now triggered a major debate on the role of nuclear weapons in NATO strategy. This is between those who believe that elimination could be a relatively cost-free approach to taking forward the disarmament agenda set out in President Obama’s April 2009 Prague speech; and those who fear it could do serious damage to the credibility of US extended nuclear deterrence. As a result, reducing from 200 weapons to zero looks set to be much more controversial than the 90 per cent reduction (from 2,500 to 200) that has taken place since 1991. What these weapons lack in operational utility (given their short range and location, together with the continuing availability of larger and more powerful strategic arsenals) is now greatly outweighed by their symbolic significance.

On the one hand, key NATO governments, including those of the US, the UK and Germany, now accept the argument that a credible non-proliferation policy also requires a strengthened commitment to nuclear disarmament. Moreover, some influential voices (within and outside government) increasingly argue that the continuing deployment of US **nuclear weapons** in Europe, alongside the dual-capable aircraft (DCA) of European NATO members, **is an obstacle** to fulfilling this commitment. The case for withdrawing these weapons has been bolstered by reports that safety standards have been compromised at the nuclear storage facilities, as well as by concerns at the budgetary cost to the US of providing protection of a sufficiently high standard. Moreover, even **supporters of continuing deployment** recognise that these forces are of little operational relevance. A combination of diplomatic, budgetary and operational reasons, therefore, is pointing to the need for a reformulated approach.

#### **Nuclear extended deterrence does nothing to prevent nuke prolif – Turkey and Germany prove**

Sauer and van der Zwaan 12 (Tom Sauer - Assistant Professor in International Politics at the University of Antwerp , Bob van der Zwaan - Senior Scientist at the Energy Research Centre of the Netherlands in Amsterdam, “US Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe after NATO’s Lisbon Summit: Why their Withdrawal is Desirable and Feasible”, International Relations, 2012, <https://www.isodarco.it/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/tacnukes_Sauer_VDZ_in_IR-2012.pdf>, MG)

Extended deterrence as a brake against further nuclear proliferation Some experts claim that thanks to US nuclear weapons stationed in Europe some host nations have agreed not to develop their own nuclear weapons.53 The states most cited are Turkey and, to a lesser extent, Germany. This argument, however, **is flawed**. In NATO there is **no proof** that it was extended deterrence that prevented nuclear proliferation. Germany is legally bound not to develop nuclear weapons because of its constitution, and German public opinion has always been very much anti-nuclear. According to Harald Müller, observers regularly underestimate how deeply rooted Germany’s non-nuclear status is in its political culture:

Any German government that sought to effect a change in the country’s nuclear status would risk public protest ranging all the way up to civil-war-style conditions compared to which the events surrounding the shifting of Castor [civilian nuclear spent fuel] containers would probably appear trivial.54

The 2011 German decision to close all German nuclear reactors is another indication of the German anti-nuclear political culture.

Likewise, it is also doubtful whether Turkey would have developed its own nuclear weapons if the United States had not stationed them in the country. There is increasing pressure today to create a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East, as formally declared during the NPT Review Conference in May 2010. This is pushing Turkey to rethink its current policy vis-à-vis US nuclear weapons based on its territory. More and more Turkish experts are in favor of withdrawal.55 In the unlikely case that the Turkish government believed that possessing nuclear weapons was of vital interest for the nation, it is **doubtful** whether the presence of the remaining number of US nuclear weapons would really makes any difference in its calculation.

### No Prolif !

#### **No nuke prolif – too expensive, too difficult, and no one cares**

Mueller 18 (John Mueller – senior fellow at the Cato Institute, “Nuclear Weapons Don’t Matter”, CATO Institute, 15 October 2018, <https://www.cato.org/commentary/nuclear-weapons-dont-matter>, MG)

\*edited for ableist language

HOW ABOUT PROLIFERATION AND TERRORISM?

Great powers are one thing, some might say, but rogue states or terrorist groups are another. If they go nuclear, it’s game over — which is why any further proliferation must be prevented by all possible measures, up to and including war.

That logic might seem plausible at first, but it **breaks down on close examination**. Not only has the world already survived the acquisition of nuclear weapons by some of the [~~craziest~~] mass murderers in history (Stalin and Mao), but proliferation has **slowed down** rather than sped up over time. Dozens of technologically sophisticated countries have considered obtaining nuclear arsenals, but very few have done so. This is because nuclear weapons turn out to be **difficult and expensive** to acquire and strategically **provocative to possess**.

They have not even proved to enhance status much, as many expected they would. Pakistan and Russia may garner more attention today than they would without nukes, but would Japan’s prestige be increased if it became nuclear? Did China’s status improve when it went nuclear — or when its economy grew? And would anybody really care (or even notice) if the current British or French nuclear arsenal was doubled or halved?

Alarmists have misjudged not only the pace of proliferation but also its effects. Proliferation is incredibly dangerous and necessary to prevent, we are told, because going nuclear would supposedly empower rogue states and lead them to dominate their region. The details of how this domination would happen are rarely discussed, but the general idea seems to be that once a country has nuclear weapons, it can use them to threaten others and get its way, with nonnuclear countries deferring or paying ransom to the local bully out of fear.

Except, of course, that in three‐​quarters of a century, the United States has **never been able to get anything close to that obedience** from anybody, even when it had a nuclear monopoly. So why should it be true for, say, Iran or North Korea? It is far more likely that a nuclear rogue’s threats would cause its rivals to **join together against the provocateur** — just as countries around the Persian Gulf responded to Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait by closing ranks to oppose, rather than acquiescing in, his effort at domination.

#### **Statistical modelling proves no nuke prolif impact**

Cohen 16 (Michael D. Cohen PhD - convenor of the National Security College’s PhD program and Senior Lecturer at the Crawford School of Public Policy, “How nuclear proliferation causes conflict: the case for optimistic pessimism”, The Nonproliferation Review, 2016, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10736700.2016.1256541>, MG)

University of Pennsylvania’s Michael Horowitz conducted a statistical analysis and found that the probability of new nuclear states reciprocating disputes quickly increases and then **decreases over time.**

The probability that a nuclear state will reciprocate a dispute with a non-nuclear state drops from .53 one year after developing nuclear weapons to .23 in year 56. Two new nuclear powers are 67 percent more likely to reciprocate a dispute than two average non-nuclear states. Two experienced nuclear powers are 65 percent less likely to reciprocate than two average non-nuclear states. The probability of dispute reciprocation between an experienced and new nuclear power is 26 percent greater than two non-nuclear states, and the probability of a very experienced state and a somewhat experienced state reciprocating is 42 percent less than two non-nuclear states.86

University of California-San Diego’s Erik Gartzke conducted a similar statistical test when the dependent variable was dispute initiation rather than reciprocation and found similarly robust results.87 Gartzke found that, while the overall effect of nuclear proliferation on conflict propensity is neutral, there is variation in the effect of proliferation over time. Nuclear proliferation influences the **timing, rather than the occurrence**, of disputes. While new nuclear states are prone to initiate militarized disputes, over time they moderate their policies and become as **likely to initiate disputes as they were before nuclear proliferation**.88 These effects wash out in statistical tests that do not control for experience with nuclear weapons. In short, if Iran and North Korea develop nuclear weapons and challenge their regional status quo, the historical record suggests that they will not do so for long. Thus James M. Lindsay and Ray Takeyh of the Council on Foreign Relations recently claimed that a nuclear Iran would be most dangerous “at first, when it would likely be at its most reckless.” But, “like other nuclear aspirants before them, the guardians of the theocracy might discover that nuclear bombs are **simply not good** for diplomatic leverage or strategic aggrandizement.” 89

Conclusion: proliferation pessimism, Iran, and North Korea

Three of the four mechanisms long alleged to make nuclear proliferation cause interstate conflict find **little to no empirical support** when the endogeneity, omitted-variable bias, and conceptual-confusion issues addressed above are recognized and applied to the evidence. Preventive-war motivations, nonsurvivable arsenals, and organizational logics that lead to accidents do not cause armed conflict. The only mechanism that has systematically led to conflict is conventional aggression by weak revisionists after nuclear proliferation, but a few years of experience with nuclear weapons moderates the conflict propensity of new nuclear states. By failing to specify how frequently we should observe preventive motivations, their effect on nonsurvivable arsenals, or how organizational logics lead to conflict, accidents, and nuclear war, **proliferation pessimist claims are unfalsifiable**. Pessimist scholars need to specify how much longer we should observe them not leading to conflict before concluding that their threat has been greatly exaggerated.

The undesirability of nuclear use has prevented scholars from coming to terms with what a more careful and systematic reading of the historical record suggests about the relationship between these mechanisms and conflict. Sagan has argued that proliferation fatalism and deterrence optimism reduce incentives to combat proliferation.90 But these same dynamics have led scholars to **vastly exaggerate** the number of threats posed by the spread of nuclear weapons. If the greatest danger posed by nuclear proliferation is conventional aggression in the short-term, scholars need to rediscover how **deterrence** can moderate the high conflict propensity of new nuclear states.91 Arguments about the frequency of nuclear escalation, however, say nothing about its cost. Isn’t the possibility of nuclear escalation on the Korean peninsula, for example, evidence against the arguments made throughout this paper? A few cases of accidental, unintentional, or deliberate nuclear escalation could show that the mechanisms offered by pessimist scholars linking nuclear proliferation and conflict survive the criticisms leveled at them here. A lower bar for the proliferation-pessimist theory to pass might be one case of nuclear escalation. But after seventy years, nuclear weapons have **not once** led to conflict through the mechanisms addressed here.

#### **Studies prove nuclear prolif has either no effect on the risk of interstate conflict or reverses it**

Suzuki 15 (Akisato Suzuki - Adjunct Research Fellow at the School of Politics and International Relations, University College Dublin, “Is more better or worse? New empirics on nuclear proliferation and interstate conflict by Random Forests”, Research and Politics, 2015, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/2053168015589625>, MG)

The main findings reveal that the optimist expectation of the relationship between nuclear proliferation and interstate conflict is empirically supported:9 first, a larger number of nuclear states on average **decreases** the systemic propensity for interstate conflict; and second, there is **no clear evidence** that the emergence of new nuclear states increases the systemic propensity for interstate conflict. Gartzke and Jo (2009) argue that nuclear weapons themselves have no exogenous effect on the probability of conflict, because when a state is engaged in or expects to engage in conflict, it may develop nuclear weapons to keep fighting, or to prepare for, that conflict. If this selection effect existed, the analysis should overestimate the conflict-provoking effect of nuclear proliferation in the above model. Still, the results indicate that a larger number of nuclear states are associated with fewer disputes in the system.

This conclusion, however, raises questions about how to reconcile this study’s findings with those of a recent quantitative dyadic-level study (Bell and Miller, 2015). The current paper finds that nuclear proliferation **decreases** the systemic propensity for interstate conflict, while Bell and Miller (2015) find that nuclear symmetry has no significant effect on dyadic conflict, but that nuclear asymmetry is associated with a higher probability of dyadic conflict. It is possible that nuclear proliferation **decreases conflict** through the conflict-mitigating effects of extended nuclear deterrence and/or fear of nuclear states’ intervention, to the extent that these effects **overwhelm** the conflict-provoking effect of nuclear–asymmetrical dyads. Thus, dyadic-level empirics cannot solely be relied on to infer causal links between nuclear proliferation and a systemic propensity for conflict. The systemic-level empirics deserve attention.

### No Deterrence !

#### **Nuclear deterrence is academic, pundit, and logical garbage**

Barash 18 (David P. Barash - professor of psychology emeritus at the University of Washington, “Nuclear deterrence is a myth. And a lethal one at that”, The Guardian, 14 January 2018, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/14/nuclear-deterrence-myth-lethal-david-barash>, MG)

Advocates of nuclear deterrence insist that we should thank it for the fact that a third world war has been avoided, even when tensions between the two superpowers – the US and the USSR – ran high.

Some supporters even maintain that deterrence set the stage for the fall of the Soviet Union and the defeat of Communism. In this telling, the West’s nuclear deterrent prevented the USSR from invading western Europe, and delivered the world from the threat of Communist tyranny.

There are, however, compelling arguments suggesting that the US and the former Soviet Union avoided world war for several possible reasons, most notably because neither side wanted to go to war. Indeed, the US and Russia never fought a war prior to the nuclear age. Singling out nuclear weapons as the reason why the Cold War never became hot is somewhat like saying that a junkyard car, without an engine or wheels, never sped off the lot only because no one turned the key. Logically speaking, there is **no way** to demonstrate that nuclear weapons kept the peace during the Cold War, or that they do so now.

Perhaps peace prevailed between the two superpowers simply because they had no quarrel that justified fighting a terribly destructive war, even a conventional one.

There is no evidence, for example, that the Soviet leadership ever contemplated trying to conquer western Europe, much less that it was restrained by the West’s nuclear arsenal. Post facto arguments – especially negative ones – might be the **currency of pundits**, but are impossible to prove, and offer no solid ground for evaluating a counterfactual claim, conjecturing why something has not happened.

In colloquial terms, if a dog does not bark in the night, can we say with certainty that no one walked by the house? Deterrence enthusiasts are like the woman who sprayed perfume on her lawn every morning. When a perplexed neighbour asked about this strange behaviour, she replied: ‘I do it to keep the elephants away.’ The neighbour protested: ‘But there aren’t any elephants within 10,000 miles of here,’ whereupon the perfume-sprayer replied: ‘You see, it works!’

The only way to make sure nuclear weapons are not used is to make sure there are no such weapons

We should **not congratulate** our leaders, or deterrence theory, much less nuclear weapons, for keeping the peace.

What we can say is that, as of this morning, those with the power to exterminate life have not done so. But this is not altogether comforting, and history is no more reassuring. The duration of ‘nuclear peace’, from the Second World War to the end of the Cold War, lasted less than five decades. More than 20 years separated the First and Second World Wars; before that, there had been more than 40 years of relative peace between the end of the Franco-Prussian War (1871) and the First World War (1914), and 55 years between the Franco-Prussian War and Napoleon’s defeat at Waterloo (1815).

Even in war-prone Europe, decades of peace have not been so rare. Each time, when peace ended and the next war began, the war involved weapons available at the time – which, for the next big one, would likely include nuclear weapons. The only way to make sure that nuclear weapons are not used is to make sure that there are no such weapons. There is **certainly no reason** to think that the presence of nuclear weapons will prevent their use. The first step to ensuring that humans do not unleash nuclear holocaust might be to show that the **Emperor Deterrence has no clothes** – which would then open the possibility of replacing the illusion with something more suitable.

It is possible that the post-1945 US-Soviet peace came ‘through strength’, but that need not imply nuclear deterrence. It is also undeniable that the presence of nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert capable of reaching each other’s homeland in minutes has made both sides edgy.

The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 – when, by all accounts, the world came closer to nuclear war than at any other time – is not testimony to the effectiveness of deterrence: the crisis occurred because of nuclear weapons. It is more likely that we have been spared nuclear war not because of deterrence but in spite of it.

Even when possessed by just one side, nuclear weapons have **not deterred** other forms of war. The Chinese, Cuban, Iranian and Nicaraguan revolutions all took place even though a nuclear-armed US backed the overthrown governments. Similarly, the US lost the Vietnam War, just as the Soviet Union lost in Afghanistan, despite both countries not only possessing nuclear weapons, but also more and better conventional arms than their adversaries. Nor did nuclear weapons aid Russia in its unsuccessful war against Chechen rebels in 1994-96, or in 1999-2000, when Russia’s conventional weapons devastated the suffering Chechen Republic.

Nuclear weapons did **not help** the US achieve its goals in Iraq or Afghanistan, which have become expensive catastrophic failures for the country with the world’s most advanced nuclear weapons. Moreover, despite its nuclear arsenal, the US remains fearful of domestic terrorist attacks, which are more likely to be made with nuclear weapons than be deterred by them.

In short, it is **not legitimate** to argue that nuclear weapons have deterred any sort of war, or that they will do so in the future. During the Cold War, each side engaged in conventional warfare: the Soviets, for example, in Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968), and Afghanistan (1979-89); the Russians in Chechnya (1994-96; 1999-2009), Georgia (2008), Ukraine (2014-present), as well as Syria (2015-present); and the US in Korea (1950-53), Vietnam (1955-75), Lebanon (1982), Grenada (1983), Panama (1989-90), the Persian Gulf (1990-91), the former Yugoslavia (1991-99), Afghanistan (2001-present), and Iraq (2003-present), to mention just a few cases.

Nor have their weapons deterred attacks upon nuclear armed states by non-nuclear opponents. In 1950, China stood 14 years from developing and deploying its own nuclear weapons, whereas the US had a well-developed atomic arsenal. Nonetheless, as the Korean War’s tide was shifting dramatically against the North, that US nuclear arsenal did not inhibit China from sending more than 300,000 soldiers across the Yalu River, resulting in the stalemate on the Korean peninsula that divides it to this day, and has resulted in one of the world’s most dangerous unresolved stand-offs.

In 1956, the nuclear-armed United Kingdom warned non-nuclear Egypt to refrain from nationalising the Suez Canal. To no avail: the UK, France and Israel ended up invading Sinai with conventional forces. In 1982, Argentina attacked the British-held Falkland Islands, even though the UK had nuclear weapons and Argentina did not.

Following the US-led invasion in 1991, conventionally armed Iraq was not deterred from lobbing Scud missiles at nuclear-armed Israel, which did not retaliate, although it could have used its nuclear weapons to vaporise Baghdad. It is hard to imagine how doing so would have benefitted anyone. Obviously, US nuclear weapons did not deter the terrorist attacks on the US of 11 September 2001, just as the nuclear arsenals of the UK and France have not prevented repeated terrorist attacks on those countries.

Nuclear weapons **didn’t** escalate demands; if anything, such countries were **less successful** in getting their way

Deterrence, in short, **does not deter**.

### Norms Check

#### **NPT and norms check prolif**

McGlinchey 22 (Stephen McGlinchey PhD - Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of the West of England, “Nuclear Weapons and International Relations”, E-International Relations, 27 March 2022, <https://www.e-ir.info/pdf/96250>, MG)

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1970) – often known as the Non-Proliferation Treaty – sought to channel nuclear technology into civilian uses and to recognise the destabilising effect of further nuclear proliferation. It was a triumph of diplomacy. The genius of the treaty was that it was aware of the realities of the international politics of the time. It was not a disarmament treaty as great powers would simply not give up their nuclear weapons, fearful their security would be diminished. So, instead of pursuing an impossible goal of eliminating nuclear weapons, the Treaty sought to freeze the number of nations that had nuclear weapons at the five states that already possessed them. Simultaneously, those five nations were encouraged to share non-military nuclear technology with other states – such as nuclear energy and nuclear medicine – so that others would not feel tempted to pursue nuclear weapons. In short, those who had nuclear weapons could keep them. Those who did not have them would be allowed to benefit from the non-military research and innovation of the existing nuclear powers.

Due to the well-considered design of the treaty and its enforcement, it has been **highly successful**. Following the end of the Cold War, the Non-Proliferation Treaty was permanently extended in 1995. Granted, it has not kept the number of nuclear nations to five, but **there are still fewer than ten** – which is far from the twenty or more projected before the treaty entered into force. States with nascent nuclear weapons programmes, such as Brazil and South Africa, gave them up due to **international pressure**. Today, only a small number of states are outside its bounds. India, Pakistan and Israel never joined as they (controversially in each case) had nuclear ambitions that they were not prepared to give up due to national security priorities. Underlining the weight of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, in 2003, when North Korea decided to rekindle earlier plans to develop nuclear weapons, they withdrew from the treaty rather than violate it. To date, North Korea remains the only state to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The non-proliferation regime is not perfect, of course – a situation best underlined today by North Korea. It is also a system with an inherent bias, since a number of states are allowed to have nuclear weapons simply because they were among the first to develop them, and this continues to be the case regardless of their behaviour. Yet, while humankind has developed the ultimate weapon in the nuclear bomb, **diplomacy has managed to prevail** in moderating its spread. When a state is rumoured to be developing a nuclear bomb, as in the case of North Korea, the reaction of the international community is always one of **common alarm**. We call ideas that have become commonplace ‘norms’ and **non-proliferation has become one of the central norms** within our global system.

### U – No US Cred Now

#### **US credibility was being questioned before Ukraine – dependence on the US is way low**

Kluth 6/20 (Andreas Kluth - Bloomberg Opinion columnist covering European politics, “Europe Needs a Better Nuclear Deterrent Against Putin”, The Washington Post, 20 June 2022, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/europe-needs-a-better-nuclear-deterrent-against-putin/2022/06/20/9f3c2e1c-f064-11ec-ac16-8fbf7194cd78_story.html>, MG)

During most of the Cold War and the years since, that question seemed settled. The European NATO members are meant to shelter under America’s nuclear “umbrella.” As part of the transatlantic alliance’s “nuclear sharing,” five partner countries — Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy and Turkey — host an estimated 100 American nukes on their soil. To retaliate against a Russian strike, the allies would be able to drop these US bombs from their own planes.

Aside from those American weapons, France and the UK also have their own arsenals. But France has always kept its nukes outside the joint strategizing of the Western alliance — it’s the only nation among NATO’s 30 member states not to participate in the alliance’s Nuclear Planning Group.

**Even before** **Putin’s war of aggression** against Ukraine this year, some Europeans worried that the American umbrella was becoming **less reliable**, and thus by definition less of a deterrent. The US has shifted its geopolitical focus from the Atlantic to the Pacific, and specifically toward containing China, which is now adding to its arsenal fast.

Washington therefore has to hold up two nuclear umbrellas and plan for two simultaneous wars. Scholars such as Maximilian Terhalle in Germany and Francois Heisbourg in France have been warning that Washington, forced to choose, would probably give priority to its commitments in Asia, and to allies such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan.

Worse, former US President Donald Trump spooked Europeans when he questioned NATO’s mutual-defense clause and even contemplated taking the US out of the alliance. Trump is gone for now. But he, or a president like him, **could return**. In the long run, the US **appears less dependable** as a protector than it used to be.

Topping all that, Putin has now gone rhetorically ballistic by dropping not-so-veiled threats that he might use nukes against Ukraine or Western countries that interfere in his war. The consensus for now is that he’s bluffing. But from the Baltic to Poland and beyond, Europeans would love to know what the back-up plan is.

### U – Nuke Prolif Now

#### **Prolif started already**

Maire 6/19 (Tania Gemma Maire - final year bachelor’s student in Asian Studies & Management at the University of Applied Sciences in Konstanz, “The New Nuclear Arms Race”, Modern Diplomacy, 19 June 2022, <https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2022/06/19/the-new-nuclear-arms-race/>, MG)

For decades, the world has been focusing on disarmament and reducing the number of nuclear weapons in circulation. Especially the main actors mentioned above were dedicated to promoting different treaties to avoid the spread. However, these public announcements, coming from wealthy, powerful nations in possession of such arms are contradictory to the **current trend in nuclear proliferation** (Al Jazeera 2022).

Even more surprising is the fact that the idea of disarmament has suddenly disappeared after the Russian attack on Ukraine. In fact, in a matter of months, actors in possession of nuclear weapons have **announced to invest in nuclear arms** in order to increase, modernize and optimize their arsenal. Countries that wanted to get rid of nuclear arms **are now putting strong importance** on the capability of their weapons. Russia’s threat of using nuclear weapons against Ukraine has provoked a common global reaction to get ready for potential danger (Al Jazeera 2022).

Therefore, it seems like Russia’s war has **already activated** a nuclear proliferation trend, stronger and faster than in the past decades. A new nuclear arms race has started, altough this time it is not about technological capability and artificial intelligence. This time it is about being prepared and ready for a potential attack from a country possessing the world’s largest nuclear arsenal (Hille 2022).

### U – Allies Won’t Prolif

#### **Allies have no incentive to go nuclear – assumes nuclear guarantees**

Korb and Cimbala 4/17 (Lawrence J. Korb -  senior fellow at the Center for American Progress and a former Assistant Secretary of Defense, Stephen J. Cimbala - Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Penn State University, “Nuclear Proliferation Is Not the Answer to the War in Ukraine”, National Interest, 17 April 2021, <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/nuclear-proliferation-not-answer-war-ukraine-201862>, MG)

States may **not gain much** from going nuclear, even if they live in a dangerous regional neighborhood and fear aggression or coercion from one or more of their neighbors. The threshold for the use of nuclear weapons is quite high, and most military coercion takes place at lower levels. **Advanced conventional weapons**, including smart drones, long-range precision strike missiles, and network-centric battle management may be as important in deterring prospective attackers as is a small nuclear arsenal. For countries such as Japan, South Korea, or Australia, for example, building and deploying next-generation conventional weapons, along with regional cooperation and U.S. support, could pay **greater dividends in deterrence** than joining the growing list of nuclear weapons states. Conventional weapons often deter because they can actually win a war at an acceptable cost, whereas nuclear weapons only deter if the threat of use—and prospect of mutual annihilation—is credible.

Considering the downside costs of regional nuclear arms races—including **massive financial costs, increased risks of proliferation or accidents, and potential sanctions**—it is doubtful that **any state** in the Middle East or the Indo-Pacific will improve their security by developing nuclear weapons. Instead, a growing number of states with small- or medium-sized nuclear arsenals will create more anxieties about the first-strike vulnerability of those forces. Few of these prospective nuclear weapons states can afford a fleet of ballistic missile submarines, currently the most survivable platforms among operationally deployed launch systems. These countries will therefore depend almost exclusively on aircraft or missiles that are less survivable and require their commanders to preempt their opponents. More states will deploy more forces, fears of a surprise attack will multiply, and the need for survivable counter-strike capabilities will lead to more nuclear weapons deployed on a “hair trigger.”

Although Russia’s war against Ukraine might lead some to conclude that nukes are a prescription for safety, the **opposite is more likely to be true**. Nuclear deterrence in a post-post-Cold War world is less dependable than it was during the Cold War because: first, the stability provided by U.S.-Soviet strategic nuclear bipolarity is gone; second, some hot zones such as Asia are already overcrowded with nuclear state actors whose leaders have no democratic accountability; and, third, leaders with or without nuclear weapons are perfectly willing to act in ways that some might judge as “irrational” according to their own definitions of victory. In this environment, **nuclear guarantees might turn from deterrents into black holes**.

### AT Funding Tradeoff

#### Nuclear weapons are untouchable

William Hartung, director of the Arms and Security Project at the Center for International Policy, April 21, 2020

“Now isn’t the time to push for nuclear modernization,” Army Times, [https://www.armytimes.com/opinion/commentary/2020/04/21/now-isnt-the-time-to-push-for-nuclear-modernization/](https://www.armytimes.com/opinion/commentary/2020/04/21/now-isnt-the-time-to-push-for-nuclear-modernization/?contentFeatureId=f0fmoahPVC2AbfL-2-1-8&contentQuery=%7B%22section%22%3A%22%2Fhome%22%2C%22exclude%22%3A%22%2Fopinion%2Fcommentary%22%2C%22from%22%3A5%2C%22size%22%3A10%7D), (accessed 5-17-2022)

Eliminating ICBMs and reducing the size of the U.S. arsenal will face strong opposition in Washington, both from strategists who maintain that the nuclear triad should be sacrosanct, and from special interests that benefit from excess spending on nuclear weapons. The Senate ICBM Coalition, composed of senators from states with ICBM bases or substantial ICBM development and maintenance work, has been particularly effective in fending any changes in ICBM policy, from reducing the size of the force to merely studying alternatives, whether those alternatives are implemented or not. Meanwhile, Northrop Grumman — currently the sole bidder for the new ICBM program — has announced that it expects to have hundreds of subcontractors spread throughout the United States for its work on the new system, known formally as the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent. The company also claims that the next phase of the work could create 10,000 jobs. That’s a tiny fraction of national employment but will pack a political punch among members of Congress whose states or districts benefit from ICBM-related employment.

#### The nuclear industry will block cuts

Fred Kaplan, author and journalist. His weekly "War Stories" column for Slate magazine covers international relations and U.S. foreign policy, April 23, 2021

“We Don’t Need a Better Nuclear Arsenal to Take on China,” Slate, <https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2021/04/nuclear-triad-overhaul-china.html>, (accessed 5-17-2022)

Richard and other senior officers know this, which is why they’re pulling out all the stops in making the case for new nukes. This week’s hearings marked the first public roll-out of the arguments, but they’ve been rehearsed in trade journals and conferences for some time now. Last fall, the Trump administration awarded Northrop Grumman a $13.3 billion sole-source contract to start developing the new ICBM, in an attempt to lock in the project and make it harder for anyone to kill it outright. Northrop Grumman had lined up more than a dozen subcontractors—including Lockheed Martin and General Dynamics, which are normally its chief competitors—in order to widen support in Congress. There will be fierce resistance to any slowdown of the strategic juggernaut. Most members of the congressional armed services committees regard the Nuclear Triad with the same veneration that Catholics bestow to the Holy Trinity. When they ask a witness if he believes in the Triad, they do so with a quivering tone, as if they were priests asking a supplicant if he believes in God.

### AT: Turkey

#### **No Turkey Prolif or inevitable – tons of alt causes**

Eldridge 11 (William G. Eldridge – United States Air Force Commander, “The Credibility of America’s Extended Nuclear Deterrent The Case of the Republic of Turkey”, Air University Press, September 2011, <https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/AUPress/Papers/wp_0018_eldridge_extended_nuclear_deterrent.pdf>, MG)

Turkey likely will “tip” if Middle East nuclear proliferation becomes widespread **and** NATO is perceived as ineffective **and** if US-Turkish relationships collapse. According to one Turkish diplomat, “**things would have to get really bad**” for Turkey to pursue its own nuclear weapons. Despite a rocky history, current NATO-Turkish and US-Turkish relations **remain fundamentally sound**, but leadership or regional security changes could strain those relationships. Factors working against Turkish nuclear weapons proliferation include the lack of support by **senior Turkish leaders**, the high value Turkey places on **alliance relationships**, the **lack of funding** for civilian or military nuclear programs, and Turkish **treaty agreements** forswearing nuclear weapons.

Despite these proliferation disincentives, Turkey will probably hedge against falling behind a potential Middle East nuclear energy (or nuclear arms) race by developing a civilian nuclear power program. As Iran continues pursuing nuclear enrichment and possibly a nuclear weapon, Turkey will likely begin to develop a nuclear power program beyond its current research stage. Turkish leaders do not fear an attack from Iran, but instead they are concerned with the shift in the regional balance of power that may result from a nuclear-armed Iran. Hedging with civilian nuclear power provides scientific and engineering expertise needed for an aggressive Turkish nuclear program if Iran’s regional influence increases or a broader Middle East nuclear arms race begins. Therefore, the United States should continue its involvement in Turkey’s emerging civilian nuclear programs utilizing the existing 2008 US-Turkish nuclear cooperation agreement (123 Agreement), develop additional cooperation agreements that encourage Turkey to forgo nuclear and spent fuel processing, encourage scientific exchanges, and consider financially supporting Turkey’s civilian nuclear energy program. The credibility of US extended nuclear deterrence for Turkey is best signaled **not** through US nuclear inventory types or numbers, but by demonstrations of US political, economic, and **security relationships** with Turkey. Turkey’s most important political and security concerns include

• credibility of NATO, EU, and US support for Turkish security;

• Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) terrorism;

• Kurdish activism in Iraq supporting a separate Kurd state;

• Cyprus;

• relations with Iran and Armenia;

• energy security and access; and

• economic strength and domestic stability.

A close US-Turkish partnership that addresses these issues can strengthen US credibility as a reliable ally. A strong US- Turkish relationship also serves as a disincentive for Turkish nuclear weapons acquisition.

#### **Turkey isn’t going to prolif**

Ülgen 12 (Sinan Ülgen - visiting scholar at Carnegie Europe in Brussels where he researches the implications of Turkish foreign policy for Europe and the United States, “TURKEY AND THE BOMB”, The Carnegie Papers, February 2012, <https://carnegieendowment.org/files/turkey_bomb.pdf>, MG)

Turkey has a stellar history of nonproliferation and has signed on to **every** relevant IAEA and international instrument governing the spread of nuclear technology. Moreover, it is a member of NATO and an EU candidate country. It is **unlikely**, absent a rupture in relations with its NATO allies, a significant change in its security environment, or a drastic reevaluation of Ankara’s immediate interests by the civilian leadership, that Turkey would consider developing nuclear weapons illicitly.

A Turkish decision to proliferate would seriously complicate its international standing, undermine its economic resurgence, and seriously damage relations with the United States and its other NATO allies. Moreover, any Turkish move toward weaponization would draw a harsh rebuke from the United States and would likely be met by an American proposal to strengthen security guarantees, as well as the threat of sanctions if Turkey were to continue its weapons efforts. Given Turkey’s nonnuclear history and its long-standing reliance on the NATO security guarantee, it is **hard to imagine a scenari**o where Turkey would simply cast aside its policy in favor of an independent weapons capability.

Instead of developing its own nuclear weapons capability, Turkey seems more interested in pursuing robust **conventional** capabilities that could, in theory, replace some of the missions previously reserved for nuclear weapons. To do so, Turkey has turned to foreign suppliers but has also committed to begin designing and manufacturing hightech weapons domestically. And it will likely continue to increase its indigenous intelligence, surveillance, and information management capabilities.26 Turkey’s changing military posture is aimed at countering the threats posed by nonstate actors and bolstering Turkey’s conventional war-fighting capabilities. Interoperability with NATO forces remains the key component of Turkey’s defense policy and it is **unlikely** that Ankara would threaten its union with its most important allies.

#### **No middle east nuclear arms race impact – assumes literally every scenario**

Cook 12 (Stephen A. Cook -  Eni Enrico Mattei senior fellow for Middle East and Africa studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, “Don’t Fear a Nuclear Arms Race in the Middle East”, Foreign Policy, 2 April 2012, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/04/02/dont-fear-a-nuclear-arms-race-in-the-middle-east/>, MG)

Most important to understanding why the Middle East **will not be a zone of unrestrained proliferation** is the significant difference between desiring nukes and the actual capacity to acquire them. Of all three states that Shavit mentioned, the one on virtually everyone’s list for possible nuclear proliferation in response to Iran is Turkey. But the Turkish Republic is already under a nuclear umbrella: Ankara safeguards roughly 90 of the United States’ finest B61 gravity bombs at Incirlik airbase, near the city of Adana. These weapons are there because Turkey is a NATO member, and Washington’s extended deterrence can be expected to at least partially mitigate Turkey’s incentives for proliferation.

But even if the Turks wanted their own bomb, they have almost **no capacity** to develop nuclear weapons technology. Indeed, **Turkey** does not even possess the capability to deliver the 40 B61 bombs at Incirlik that are allocated to Turkish forces in the event of an attack, according to a report released by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Given the changes in Turkey’s foreign policy and its drive for global influence, it is conceivable that it will want to develop a Turkish version of France’s force de frappe. However, Ankara would literally be **starting from scratch**: Turkey has no fissile material, cannot mine or enrich uranium, and does not possess the technology to reprocess spent fuel, all of which are required for nuclear weapons development.

This does not mean that Turkey is not interested in nuclear technology. Yet Ankara’s efforts, to the extent that they exist beyond the two small-scale facilities in Ankara and Kucukcekmece, are directly related to the country’s predicted energy shortfall resulting from the combination of a booming economy and growing population. The Turkish government has announced plans for civilian nuclear power to provide a quarter of Turkey’s electricity needs by 2040. But even this three-decade timeline seems overly optimistic given the inchoate nature of Turkey’s nuclear research.

The Egyptians are way ahead of the Turks in developing nuclear infrastructure, but don’t expect to see the rise of a nuclear power on the Nile anytime soon. Egypt’s nuclear program is actually older than India’s, and was established only three years after Israel founded its Atomic Energy Commission. The Egyptian Atomic Energy Commission, which Gamal Abdel Nasser established in 1955, was exclusively dedicated to the development of peaceful atomic energy, though there were suspicions to the contrary. The 1956 nuclear cooperation agreement with the Soviet Union transferred to Egypt a 2-megawatt light water reactor that only produced small amounts of plutonium.

There were, of course, worrying signs about the Egyptian program — specifically Cairo’s refusal to open the Inshas reactor to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection until after the peace treaty with Israel. Yet neither President Anwar Sadat nor his successor, the recently deposed Hosni Mubarak, ever made any effort to develop nuclear weapons technology. Sadat signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1980, and Mubarak negotiated with the United States, France, Canada, and Germany for reactors and funding for Egypt’s nuclear program. Nothing, however, ever came of these discussions because of the 1986 Chernobyl disaster — and the fact that the Egyptians never signed what is known as the Additional Protocol, which gives the IAEA enhanced powers to inspect nuclear facilities. Given the trajectory of Egypt’s nuclear development, Cairo’s rejection of the Additional Protocol had more to do with politics and sovereignty than plans for a clandestine weapons program.

Even after Mubarak’s son Gamal triumphantly declared at the ruling party’s 2006 convention that Egypt was going to ramp up its nuclear development program, it is hard to believe that Egyptians ever really took him seriously. Mubarak spent $160 million on consultants to tell him where to build 10 planned nuclear power plants, and selected a location along the Mediterranean for the first one. But each of the power plants comes with a price tag of $1.5 billion — and this is a country that in the last 15 months has spent approximately $26 billion of its $36 billion foreign currency reserves just to stay afloat.

One has to wonder about the pundits’ warning of an Egyptian bomb: **Have they even been to Egypt lately**? If so, they might have a better grasp of Egypt’s **ramshackle infrastructure** and the **dire state of its economy**, neither of which can support a nuclear program.

What about **Saudi Arabia**, then, the Sunni power that is on the tip of most analysts’ tongues when it comes to Shiite Iran getting the bomb? Saudi Arabia has the cash to make large-scale investments in nuclear technology. Indeed, the only factor that makes warnings about Saudi proliferation — such as that delivered by former Ambassador the United States Prince Turki al-Faisal last year — even remotely credible is the resources the Saudis can muster to buy a nuclear program. Yet, while Riyadh can outfit itself with nuclear facilities with ease, it does **not have the capacity to manage them**. Mohamed Khilewi, a former Saudi diplomat, claims that the kingdom has been developing a nuclear arsenal to counter Israel since the mid-1970s — but he offers no substantiated evidence to support these claims.

In fact, the country has no nuclear facilities and no scientific infrastructure to support them. It’s possible that Saudi Arabia could import Pakistanis to do the work for them. But while Saudis feel comfortable with Pakistanis piloting some of their warplanes and joining their ground forces, setting up a nuclear program subcontracted with Pakistani know-how — or even acquiring a nuclear device directly from Islamabad — poses a range of **political risks** for the House of Saud. No doubt there would be considerable international opprobrium. Certainly Washington, which implicitly extends its nuclear umbrella to Saudi Arabia, would have a jaundiced view of a nuclear deal between Riyadh and Islamabad. Moreover, it’s one thing to hand the keys to an F-15 over to a foreigner, but letting them run your nuclear program is another matter altogether.

The concern about Saudi proliferation stems from fears that the kingdom would be forced to act if both Iran and Israel possessed a nuclear arsenal. "We cannot live in a situation where Iran has nuclear weapons and we don’t," an unnamed Saudi official declared to the Guardian on the sidelines of a meeting between Prince Turki al Faisal and NATO officials in June 2011. "It’s as simple as that. If Iran develops a nuclear weapon, that will be unacceptable to us and we will have to follow suit."

Yet given the fact that the Saudis have very little nuclear infrastructure to speak of, this kind of statement is little more than posturing designed to force the U.S. hand on Iran. Unlike similar warnings by Israel, which has the capacity to follow through on its threat to attack Iran’s nuclear sites, Riyadh’s rhetoric about acquiring nuclear weapons is **empty**. What is amazing is how many people take the Saudis seriously. If Khilewi had been telling the truth, now would seem like a good time for the Riyadh to give Tehran a look at what the royal family has been hiding in the palace basement all these years — but so far, we have only heard crickets.

Despite its flimsiness, it is hard to ignore the utility of the Middle East’s nuclear dominoes theory. For those who advocate a preventive military strike on Iran, it provides a sweeping geopolitical rationale for a dangerous operation. But the evidence doesn’t bear this argument out: If Washington decides it has no other option than an attack, it should do so because Iran is a threat in its own right, and not because it belives it will thwart inevitable proliferation in places like Turkey, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. It won’t, for the simple reason that there is **no reason** to believe these countries represent a proliferation risk in the first place.